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Abstract
Secure multi-party computation is a problem where a number of parties want to
compute a function of their inputs in a secure way. Security implies correctness
of the outputs and privacy of the inputs, even when some parties are cheating.
This problem has been at the centre of cryptography research for almost
30 years. However, it is only recently that practical applications have been
developed, for example, in auctions, voting systems or data mining. In this
vein, this thesis aims to securely solve classical algorithmic problems using
multi-party computation techniques, but departs from the traditional focus on
problems that admit a simple circuit representation to investigate problems with
a richer structure. First, this work presents new sorting algorithms based on
a unary representation of integers. These algorithms can be used efficiently
as subroutines for applications that make use of the unary representation, for
example, in addressing mechanisms. Second, a new procedure to ob...
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Nowadays, cryptography can be found everywhere. During the last century,
cryptography has quickly evolved from an art mainly used by the army to a
science used by billions of people. At the same time, the number of applications
also exploded: message encryption and authentication, digital signatures, digital
cash and electronic voting to cite but a few.
In this thesis, we focus on a particular area of cryptography: secure multi-party
computation. Secure MPC is a problem where a number of parties want to
compute a function of their inputs in a secure way (Figure 1.1). Security implies
correctness of the outputs and privacy of the inputs, even when some parties
are cheating. This problem has been at the centre of cryptography research for
almost 30 years. However, it is only recently that practical applications have
been developed, for example, in auctions, voting systems or data mining.
Following these results, the research question of this thesis is to identify more
complex algorithmic problems that can be securely solved using multi-party
computation techniques. In other words, the goal of this thesis is to depart from
the traditional focus on problems that admit a simple circuit representation to
investigate problems with a richer structure.
Section 1.1 goes through the scope and motivation of our research. Section 1.2
details the core contributions of our work and Section 1.3 presents the outline
of the thesis.
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
P1 P2
P3 P4
x1
f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
x2
f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
x3
f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
x4
f(x1, x2, x3, x4)
Figure 1.1: Secure multi-party computations between 4 parties.
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1.1 Scope and Motivation
In many cases, competing or distrustful parties want to acquire some common
information based on private data. A major challenge is to reveal the useful
information without leaking anything else. These settings are very common in
today’s world as illustrated by the wide range of applications hereunder.
- Benchmarking is a typical application of secure multi-party computation.
Different companies want to compare their performances but no company
is ready to reveal its key figures. For example, large-scale retailers would
be interested in comparing their salary costs, hospitals their nosocomial
infection rates or farmers their production efficiency.
- In auctions, the auctioneer and the bidders want to know who won the
auction as well as the value of the highest bid. However, they may also
be interested in keeping the individual bids secret. A private auction can
increase the profit for the auctioneer by making bidders give their true
valuations of the item. At the same time, this true valuation is kept secret
so the bidders do not take the risk of revealing sensitive information that
could be misused later.
- In voting systems, the parties want to learn the winner and preserve the
privacy of their votes. Voting schemes cannot leak any information except
the result of the vote.
- Data mining applications are also promising. Parties with confidential
databases want to extract common information without revealing the
content of their database. For example, intelligence agencies could share
information on potential terrorists.
In today’s literature, a lot of work has been done to evaluate a given circuit
efficiently. However, it is not enough for many high-level problems. Our work is
independent from this research direction. In this thesis, we investigate secure
multi-party computation techniques to solve classical algorithmic problems
securely while avoiding a combinatorial explosion. The solutions we propose
are not exclusively dedicated to a specific application. For example, our sorting
algorithms could be used to compute the winner of an auction as well as to
benchmark the well-being at work in different sectors of a large company. In
summary, our MPC algorithms can be viewed as a library of building blocks for
a wide range of secure applications.
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1.2 Main Contributions
In this thesis, we investigate sorting, game theory and graph theory problems,
which cannot be solved securely using traditional circuit-based approaches. Our
main contributions to new secure algorithms are listed below.
- We present new sorting algorithms based on a unary representation of
integers. These algorithms can be used efficiently as subroutines for
applications that make use of the unary representation, for example, in
addressing mechanisms. We benchmark these algorithms with a secure
implementation of a sorting network. The design of these algorithms
strongly differs from standard techniques such as Quicksort, Shellsort or
sorting networks.
- We provide a new procedure to obtain a fair division of a heterogeneous
resource between competing parties. This procedure takes advantage
of the secure setting (the preferences of the parties are kept secret).
The procedure does not have a counterpart in game theory and enables
reaching an equilibrium that dominates those that were previously known
in unmediated procedures. This result was presented at WISSec 2010 [1].
- We develop the first secure single-source shortest path and maximum flow
algorithms. None of the known algorithms for solving these problems can
be described as circuits, as needed for an immediate transposition to a
secure setting. Depending on the setting, our algorithms raise intriguing
questions in terms of asymptotic complexity, compared to their traditional
counterpart (Bellman-Ford, Dijkstra, Edmonds-Karp,...). We compare
the different versions and propose implementation prototypes. This result
was presented at Financial Cryptography 2013 [2].
The algorithmic problems we solved have been studied thoroughly, independently
of any security concern. We highlight fundamental problems that arise when
they need to be solved securely. Three challenges seem particularly important.
- Complexity Gaps. This thesis analyses the complexity gaps between
the traditional algorithms and their secure counterparts. A multitude
of criteria come into play to determine these gaps. The data to keep
confidential, the structure of the problem and the type of primitives used
are as many central elements. For example, the best solution to achieve a
fair and secure division of a resource (plot of land, house chores,...) is to
design a completely new algorithm. Conversely, it is possible to translate
sorting networks quite directly into a secure version.
There is very little research about these complexity gaps. Our work
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highlights little known problems and gives rise to many open questions.
For example, it is not clear whether these complexity gaps are inherent to
a particular problem or if there is a way to prove a lower bound on these
gaps.
- Leakage by data structure and execution flow. Most traditional efficient
algorithms have an execution flow that depends on the data that are
manipulated: control flow will happen as a function of data that must be
kept secret, as the result of branching or loop exit conditions for instance.
Therefore, new algorithms are needed in order to prevent undesirable
information leakages without causing combinatorial explosions that trivial
solutions would produce.
- Different efficiency metrics. The traditional complexity metrics do not
transpose to secure computation. For instance, it is typically more expen-
sive, by more than two orders of magnitude, to compare values than to
multiply them. As a result, some shortest path algorithms with higher
complexity become faster for most problems with practical size, due
to the fact they require fewer comparisons than multiplications. This
motivates substantial departures from traditional approaches to reach
practical/optimal solutions.
These lines of research are expected to bring algorithmic advances that are
crucial towards the practical use of privacy-preserving algorithms and, as a
consequence of the removal of privacy concerns, a more effective collaboration
between competing entities on various markets.
1.3 Organization of the thesis
The thesis is organized in three main parts. Part 1 consists of Chapter 2 and 3.
It is a preliminary part and presents material used all along the thesis. For
example, it details the setting, some notations and a specific representation for
integers. Part 2 consists of Chapters 4, 5 and 6. It is the core part of our work
and includes our contributions on different multi-party computation protocols.
Part 3 consists of Chapter 7. It draws the conclusions of our research.
Chapter 2 presents a short introduction to the multi-party computation tech-
niques used in the thesis. We present basics like the type of adversaries, the
model of communications and the fundamental impossibility results for threshold
adversaries. Then, we describe the outlines of a secure multi-party protocol,
from secret sharing to result reconstruction. We also give an insight into the
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various practical applications and the current frameworks before presenting the
setting and notations we will use throughout the thesis. Appendix A provides a
summary of well-known MPC primitives.
Chapter 3 introduces a different way to represent the shared values. The
shared values are represented as unary counters. We describe the definition
of unary counters as well as basic operations like indexing, updating a vector
at a shared position or incrementing a shared unary index. We also detail
interesting applications of the unary representation. We try to give a quite
complete overview of the strengths and weaknesses of this approach because it
will be used in several parts of the thesis.
Chapter 4 presents secure sorting protocols that can be used as such or as
building blocks for secure applications. We explore two approaches. In the
first one, we used sorting networks. Thanks to this technique, it is quite easy
to obtain a secure protocol without any asymptotic overhead. The second
approach uses the unary representation of the integers in order to sort them.
This chapter also illustrates the fundamental problems that arise when classical
algorithms have to be solved securely. Our secure protocols rely on previous
works on MPC and on traditional sorting algorithms.
Chapter 5 presents secure solutions to a game-theoretic problem: the cake-
cutting problem. Our cryptographic solutions address some important short-
comings of traditional game-theoretic procedures. We describe the modelling
of the cake-cutting problem and detail the secure cake-cutting protocol. We
also give implementation results. Appendix B provides a short outline on the
standard definitions of game theory. Appendix C illustrates these definitions on
the cake-cutting problem.
Chapter 6 presents a way to securely solve simple combinatorial graph problems:
the single-source shortest path and the maximum flow problems. Our protocols
can be used as such or as building blocks for more complex secure applications.
It also presents a variant of our single-source shortest path algorithm. We use a
priority queue to store the vertices. Thanks to this priority queue, we do not
need to compute a minimum at each iteration.
Chapter 7 presents our conclusion and discusses the perspectives for future
researches.
Part I
Preliminaries

Chapter 2
Background
Secure multi-party computation – the problem of jointly evaluating a function
on a set of secret inputs without leaking anything but the output of the function –
has been at the centre of cryptography research for almost 30 years. A first series
of foundational works demonstrates the possibility to evaluate any function in
various models, the function being described as a circuit [3],[4],[5],[6].
Then, the attention focused largely on building solutions for the evaluation
of functions of specific interest, leading to secure and efficient protocols for
auctions, voting, benchmarking, data mining, face recognition or AES evaluation,
to mention only a few. The common point between all these applications is
that entities are reluctant to share their private data.
The goal of this chapter is to present a short introduction to the multi-party
computation (MPC) techniques used in the thesis as well as to locate our results
among the existing literature. Background about general cryptography can be
found in standard textbooks [7], [8], [9] and detailed background about secure
multi-party computation can be found in widely available articles [10], [11].
Section 2.1 focuses on MPC basics: the types of adversaries, the models of com-
munication and the impossibility results for threshold adversaries. Section 2.2
describes the outlines of a secure multi-party protocol: the secret sharing, the
secure multi-party computation and the result reconstruction. It also highlights
the complexity difference that exists between a secure addition and a secure
multiplication. Section 2.4 describes the well-studied practical applications of
MPC and presents the main current MPC frameworks: Fairplay, Sharemind,
SEPIA, TASTY, VIFF and SCAPI. Finally, Section 2.5 presents the setting
and notations used throughout the thesis.
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2.1 MPC Basics
Secure multi-party computation is the problem of k players who want to compute
an agreed function of their inputs in a secure way. Security implies correctness
of the outputs and privacy of the inputs, even when some parties are cheating.
In concrete terms, there are k ≥ 2 players P1,...,Pk, where Pi knows his input
xi. The players want to compute f(x1, ..., xk) = (y1, ..., yk) so that Pi learns
the output yi and nothing more, except for information that can be deduced
from (xi, yi). The expression f(x1, ..., xk) = y means that all outputs are the
same.
Secure multi-party computation can alternatively and more generally be seen
as the problem of performing a task among a set of players [12]. The task is
specified by involving a trusted party and the goal of the protocol is to replace
the need for the trusted party. In other words, the functionality of the trusted
party is shared among the players.
Yao’s millionaire’s problem is a classical illustration of the use of MPC. Two
millionaires want to know who is the richest without having to reveal their
respective wealth. They compute the function f(x1, x2) = x1 <
? x2 securely
where the two inputs x1 and x2 stand for the number of millions each of them
owns. When the first millionaire is poorer than the second one, the value of
the function f(x1, x2) is 1, otherwise it is 0. The secure computation of the
function by the two millionaires should not reveal anything more about their
fortune.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the security definition of a multi-party protocol. The
scheme is secure if a player (here P1) cannot distinguish between the situation
where he is actually exchanging information with the other players and the
situation where he is exchanging information with a trusted party (T ) with the
intervention of a simulator (S).
2.1.1 Adversaries
The adversary A stands for the set of cheating players. In other words, an
adversary may corrupt a subset of players. Once corrupted, a player gives the
adversary his entire history, i.e., the complete information on all the actions
and messages he has received so far.
There are different kinds of corruptions. Passive corruption means that the
adversary can read all the data of the corrupted players but he cannot modify
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P1
P2 P3
x1
f(x1, x2, x3)
x2
f(x1, x2, x3) f(x1, x2, x3)
x3
P1
≈
P1
S T
x1
x1 x2 x3
f(x1, x2, x3)
f(x1, x2, x3)
x1
Figure 2.1: The scheme is secure if P1 cannot distinguish between the two
situations.
their behaviour, i.e., players still execute the protocol correctly. Passive corrup-
tion is also called the honest-but-curious model or the semi-honest model. On
the other hand, active corruption means that the adversary takes full control of
the corrupted players, i.e., players may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol.
Active corruption is also called the malicious model.
Static corruption signifies that the subset of corrupted players is fixed in advance
whereas adaptive corruption signifies that new players can be corrupted during
the protocol execution.
2.1.2 Models of Communication
The two basic models of communication are the cryptographic and the informa-
tion theoretic models.
The cryptographic model was introduced by Yao [13] and Goldreich, Micali,
and Wigderson [4]. In the cryptographic model, communication channels are
supposed to be authenticated but insecure: the adversary has access to all the
messages sent but he cannot modify them. Security can thus only be guaranteed
in a cryptographic sense, i.e., assuming that the adversary cannot solve some
computational problem.
The information theoretic model was first called the non-cryptographic model
and was introduced by Ben-Or, Goldwasser and Wigderson [5] and Chaum,
Cre´peau and Damg˚ard [6]. In the information-theoretic (I.T.) model, communi-
cation channels are supposed to be pairwise secure, i.e, the adversary gets no
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information at all about messages exchanged between honest players. Security
can then be guaranteed even when the adversary has unbounded computing
power.
Both models have their own advantages and drawbacks. In the cryptographic
model, data is encrypted using public-key algorithms. This approach implies the
use of far larger integers than the data we are using, hence an important cost in
terms of efficiency. However, this model is interesting when a large number of
parties wish to compute a quite easy function of their inputs. This is typically
the case in voting systems or in auctions. The information theoretic model is
based on a sharing of the data rather than a sharing of the keys. Because of
the need to distribute independently shared versions of the secret data, this
model is more relevant for applications with a small number of parties. This is
typically the case for negotiation problems. The I.T. model allows us to work
with smaller integers. Contrary to the cryptographic model, the integers are
of the same size as the data used. For these reasons, the information theoretic
model seems more suitable for our problems.
In this work, communication is assumed to be synchronous in the I.T. model.
A protocol proceeds in rounds: in every round, each player may send a message
to each other player, and all the messages are delivered before the next round
begins. In an asynchronous model of communication, there is no guarantee on
message delivery or bounds on transit time. Problems can thus only be solved
in a strictly weaker sense.
2.1.3 Impossibility Results for Threshold Adversaries
A protocol cannot be secure if any subset of the k players can be corrupted.
Limitations must be specified on the subsets the adversary can corrupt. If the
adversary is allowed to corrupt all the subsets of the parties of size at most t for
some t < k, then it is called a threshold adversary and t is called the threshold.
In the cryptographic model, security with a computationally bounded threshold
adversary is possible if at most t < k/2 of the players are corrupted. The same
result holds for active and passive corruption [4].
In the information theoretic model, unconditional security is possible if at most
t < k/3 of the players are actively corrupted. For passive corruption, the
threshold is t < k/2. The bound t < k/3 for active corruption can be reduced
to t < k/2, assuming the existence of a broadcast channel [4], [6].
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2.2 Outlines of a Secure MPC Protocol
Secure multi-party computation can be divided typically into three phases. First,
each player Pi shares his input xi secretly between the k players (including
himself). Now, all the players have a secret share of the input xi of each other
player. Second, each player runs a protocol with, as inputs, the k shares he
has received. The goal is to compute the function y = f(x1, . . . , xk) securely
without a trusted party. Each player’s output is a share of the secret value y.
Third, the shares can be used for further computation or revealed to the players
who can then reconstruct y.
For example, suppose that k players want to compute the function y = x1 +
. . . + xk securely in the I.T. scenario with a passive adversary. Each player
Pi can use Shamir’s scheme [14] to share his secret xi ∈ Zq, where Zq =
{x ∈ Z | 0 ≤ x ≤ q − 1}, q > k and q is a prime. Player Pi chooses random
cmi ∈ Zq for m = 1, ..., t, and sets [xi]qj = xi+
∑t
m=1 cmij
m mod q. Acting like
this, Pi has the guarantee that less than t+1 shares [xi]
q
j do not reveal anything
about his secret xi. Player Pi sends [xi]
q
j to player Pj . Shamir’s scheme is
linear, so addition is performed by having all players locally adding their shares.
Player Pi gets his share [y]
q
i of the secret y by computing [x1]
q
i + . . . + [xk]
q
i .
Any set of t players can reconstruct the secret value y by interpolating their
shares.
2.2.1 Secret Sharing
In concrete terms, suppose three players (A, B and C) want to compute the
sum of their secrets (a, b and c) without having to reveal them. Let Z7 =
{0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, a = 2, b = 6 and c = 3. The sum is s = 11 ≡ 4 (mod 7). One
player at the most can be corrupted (t = 1 because t < k/2), the secrets are
thus shared through polynomials of degree 1. Each player selects one random
element in Z7 for the coefficient of the polynomial (the independent term is the
secret). Players A, B and C choose α = 1, β = 5 and γ = 0 respectively. Each
player now has a polynomial to share his secret. For example, player A sets
[a]qi = a+ α · i1 mod q.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the secret sharing of each player while Table 2.1 describes
the corresponding computations.
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x
y
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6 y = x+ 2
a = 2 (A’s secret)
[a]71 = 3
[a]72 = 4
[a]73 = 5
(a) A’s secret sharing
x
y
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
y = −2x+ 6
b = 6 (B’s secret)
[b]71 = 4
[b]72 = 2
[b]73 = 0
(b) B’s secret sharing
x
y
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
y = 3
c = 3 (C’s secret)
[c]71 = 3
[c]72 = 3
[c]73 = 3
(c) C’s secret sharing
Figure 2.2: Secret sharing.
Shares of a = 2
sent from A
Shares of b = 6 sent
from B
Shares of c = 3 sent
from C
to A [a]71 = 2 + 1 · 1 = 3 [b]71 = 6+5 ·1 = 11 ≡ 4 [c]71 = 3 + 0 · 1 = 3
to B [a]72 = 2 + 1 · 2 = 4 [b]72 = 6+5 ·2 = 16 ≡ 2 [c]72 = 3 + 0 · 2 = 3
to C [a]73 = 2 + 1 · 3 = 5 [b]73 = 6+5 ·3 = 21 ≡ 0 [c]73 = 3 + 0 · 3 = 3
Table 2.1: Computation and exchange of shares between the players.
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2.2.2 Secure Computation and Secret Reconstruction
After this first step, the secret sharing, the second step deals with the multi-party
computation strictly speaking. Each player performs the same computation
(here a sum) on the shares he received. Secure addition can be achieved locally.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the local sum of each player. For the sake of clarity, the
result is not represented modulo 7 (as it should be).
x
y
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
y = −2x+ 6
a = 6
y = 2b = 2
y = x+ 3
c = 2
y = −x+ 11
d
A B C
a 6 4 2 0
b 2 2 2 2
c 3 4 5 6
d =
a+ b+ c
11 10 9 8
d mod 7 4 3 2 1
Figure 2.3: Sum of three shared values.
The corresponding computations of A,B and C are detailed here. A, B and C
compute [d]
7
1 = [a]
7
1 + [b]
7
1 + [c]
7
1 = 10 ≡ 3 (mod 7), [d]72=[a]72 + [b]72 + [c]72 = 9 ≡
2 (mod 7) and [d]
7
3 = [a]
7
3 + [b]
7
3 + [c]
7
3 = 8 ≡ 1 (mod 7) to have a polynomial
share of d = a + b + c. Two players (at least) compute the secret d = 4 by
interpolating their shares ([d]
7
1 = 3, [d]
7
2 = 2 and [d]
7
3 = 1).
2.2.3 A More Complex Example
Secure addition of shared secrets is local and easy but other functions can be
more complicated to evaluate securely. Multiplication, for example, cannot
be performed locally. Multiplication uses a re-sharing step that requires one
round of communication between the players. Let us assume that a and b are
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shared polynomially over a large field between A, B and C. As it can be seen
on Figure 2.4, the local multiplication leads to a 2-degree polynomial, whose
independent term is a · b. This polynomial has to be replaced by a random
polynomial of degree 1 with the same independent term. It will be achieved
thanks to a re-sharing step.
The three steps to multiply two shared values [a]qi and [b]
q
i are summarized
below. A detailed proof is given by Gennaro et al. [15].
- Local multiplication: [d]qi = [a]
q
i [b]
q
i .
- Re-sharing of [d]qi by choosing a random polynomial hi(x) of degree 1 so
that hi(0) = [d]
q
i .
- Recombination by computing the linear combination H(j) =
∑3
i=1 λihi(j).
The Lagrange coefficients λi are public and independent of the shares.
x
y
1 2 3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
y2 = 2x+ 2
b = 2
y1 = −x+ 4
a = 4
y3 = y1y2
d
A B C
a 4 3 2 1
b 2 4 6 8
d = ab 8 12 12 8
d1 12 10 8 6
d2 12 9 6 3
d3 8 9 10 11
e = 3d1 −
3d2 + d3
8 12 16 20
Figure 2.4: Multiplication of two shared values.
As we can see, secure addition and secure multiplication are already different
in terms of complexity and communication. Other functions, like comparison,
involve a lot more rounds and have a higher complexity (see Appendix A).
These differences of complexity are one of the big challenges when developing
secure applications. The most efficient algorithm might not be the best one to
use in MPC.
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2.3 A Related Tool: Oblivious Memories
Oblivious memories (ORAM) [16], [17], [18], [19] allow outsourcing some data
on a remote server and accessing it in a way that makes it infeasible to know
what specific piece of data has been accessed. Oblivious RAM might speed up
secure multi-party computation when they involve large data, for example in
data mining. However, it comes with a non-negligible computational overhead,
O(log2 n), in the best solutions. This overhead can be fairly important given the
relatively small representations that are often at stake in negotiation problems.
We also observe that the techniques used there are fundamentally probabilis-
tic, which is quite different from the approach that we use, which seeks for
obliviousness and has deterministic execution patterns. Oblivious RAM or
similar oblivious data structures could be a very useful tool in specific cases,
as a complement of the techniques we use. However, it does not seem to help
for branching which is the problem we encounter the most in our negotiation
problems.
2.4 MPC in Practice
This section presents some applications of MPC and gives the current implemen-
tations of MPC protocols. Some frameworks are tailored for specific applications
(data mining, for example). The main features of each implementation are
summarized in Table 2.2.
2.4.1 Applications
Since the first fundamental feasibility results of MPC more than 30 years
ago, many practical applications have been proposed. The MPC techniques
are particularly useful for applications involving different participants with
conflicting interests who want to keep their data confidential. This is the case
for numerous varied applications.
Bogetoft et al. give an implementation of secure auctions for practical real-world
problems [20]. They address the problem of double auctions of a single divisible
commodity with multiple sellers and buyers. The disclosure of an individual
bid may be of great interest for the other buyers, who can use the revealed
information to adapt their strategy, not only for the current auction but also
for upcoming ones. This result led to the first real-world MPC application [21].
In 2008, MPC were used to determine the annual Danish market price of sugar
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beets. The national auction took place with about 1200 farmers and lasted
about 30 minutes. In 2009, Miltersen et al. proposed a rational cryptographic
protocol for a single item auction [22].
In 1996, Cramer et al. presented an efficient voting scheme that satisfies universal
verifiability, privacy and robustness. The computational and communication
complexity are essentially linear, instead of quadratic as for previous schemes [23].
In 2007, Clarkson et al. presented Civitas, the first electronic voting system that
is coercion-resistant, universally verifiable and suitable for remote voting [24].
Civitas uses MPC techniques for computing the tally. In 2009, the rector of the
Universite´ catholique de Louvain was elected using an open-audit system [25].
In 2011, the Norwegian government ran a trial of internet remote voting. During
the local government elections, electors in 10 municipalities voted from home
with their own computers. The voting system is based on ElGamal encryption
of ballots and a mix-net for decryption [26], [27].
Branching programs are commonly used to model diagnostic and classification
algorithms with applications in areas such as health care, fault diagnostic or
benchmarking. Barni et al. present efficient privacy-protecting protocols for
remote evaluation of such algorithms. They apply their protocols to the secure
classification of medical ElectroCardioGram (ECG) signals [28].
Lindell and Pinkas address the problem of secure data mining. They propose
a protocol based on the ID3 algorithm that is more efficient than generic
solutions in terms of number of rounds of communication and bandwidth [29],
[30]. Lindell and Pinkas provide a survey of the basic paradigms and notions of
secure multi-party computation used for secure data mining [31]. As detailed in
Section 2.4.2, Sharemind is a dedicated framework for data mining applications.
Bogdanov et al. developed high-performance secure multi-party computation
for data mining applications [32]. Sharemind was used for financial reporting in
a consortium [33], for large-scale genome-wide association studies [34] and for
studies on linked databases [35].
Automatic recognition of human faces is another topic that raises important
privacy issues, for example, when a client searches privately for a specific face
image in the database of a server. Erkin et al. are the first to propose a
recognition system that hides the biometrics and the result from the server
performing the computation [36]. Sadeghi, Schneider and Wehrenberg also
propose a secure face recognition scheme and give implementation results that
show the practicality of their solution even for large databases [37].
Similar techniques have been used for AES evaluation [38], [39], [40]. These last
results show the fast progress in generic MPC. In 2009, Pinkas et al. provided
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the first implementation of MPC for 2 parties with active security. Their
implementation was able to evaluate a circuit of about 3 · 104 gates in about
103 seconds [38]. In 2012, Nielsen et al. were able to evaluate the same circuit
in less than 5 seconds [40].
2.4.2 Frameworks
In the last years, various MPC frameworks have been implemented. They were
often designed with a specific application in mind. SEPIA and VIFF are based
on Shamir’s secret sharing scheme and are the most general multi-party frame-
works. Sharemind is a 3-party framework dedicated to computations on large
databases. Fairplay and TASTY are 2-party frameworks and require therefore
computational security. These frameworks are based either on homomorphic
encryption (HE) or garbled circuits (GC). Homomorphic encryption is computa-
tionally expensive, while garbled circuits require generating a circuit computing
the function. We describe hereunder the most well-known frameworks.
Fairplay (www.cs.huji.ac.il/project/Fairplay) is a general-purpose frame-
work for MPC [41]. It uses a high-level function description language. Functions
are computed using Yao’s protocol for secure evaluations of boolean circuits.
Fairplay was designed for two-party computation but has been extended for
multi-party computation: FairplayMP [42].
Sharemind (sharemind.cyber.ee/research) is a framework for secure data
mining applications [43]. It uses a special choice of arithmetic: an additive secret
sharing scheme over the ring Z232 . SecreC is a secure programming language
designed for data mining tools.
SEPIA - SEcurity through Private Information Aggregation (sepia.ee.ethz.
ch) is a Java library for MPC using Shamir’s secret sharing [44], [45]. It is
tailored for network security and monitoring applications (the basic operations
are optimized for large numbers of parallel invocations).
TASTY - Tool for Automating Secure Two-partY computation is a general-
purpose tool for secure computation between exactly 2 parties [46]. It uses
combinations of garbled circuits and homomorphic encryption techniques.
VIFF - The Virtual Ideal Functionality Framework (http://viff.dk) is a
high-level framework for asynchronous multi-party computation [47], [48]. It is
implemented in Python and exploits the Twisted library for the asynchronous
communications. It uses Shamir’s secret sharing and the arithmetic operations
include secure comparison. VIFF proposes protocols for passive and active
security.
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Implementation
language
Building
techniques
Number of
participants
Fairplay /
FairplayMP
SFDL (Java) Garbled circuits
2 parties / 3 or
more parties
Sharemind SecreC (C++)
Additive secret
sharing
exactly 3 parties
SEPIA Java
Shamir’s secret
sharing
3 or more parties
TASTY
Tastyl (based on
Python)
GC and HE 2 parties
VIFF Python
Shamir’s secret
sharing
3 or more parties
SCAPI Java Garbled circuits
2 parties and
multi parties
Wysteria
Wysteria (based
on OCaml)
Secret sharing
2 parties and
multi parties
Table 2.2: Comparison of the current MPC frameworks.
SCAPI - The Secure Computation Application Programming Interface (crypto.
biu.ac.il/scapi) will be a Java library designed for secure computation [49].
Still under development, it is meant to be a general infrastructure and does not
target any specific protocol.
Wysteria is a high-level programming language for generic, mixed-mode multi-
party computations [50]. The novelty of this programming language is to
propose two computation modes: a secure mode to perform synchronous MPC
and a parallel mode to perform local and private computations in parallel.
2.5 Security Assumptions and Notations
We build our protocols on top of an ideal functionality: the arithmetic black-box
functionality FABB of Damg˚ard and Nielsen [51] whose definition captures the
properties we need. This functionality allows n parties to store elements of a
ring Zm securely, to perform the ring operations of addition and multiplication
on these elements repeatedly, and to open the result of the computation when
needed. Following Toft [52], we consider a slightly extended and abstracted
version of this functionality that offers the possibility to perform secure compa-
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rison and consider any possible ring. So, storing, opening, adding, multiplying
and comparing will be the only secure operations on which our protocols will
rely.
Addition and multiplication by a public value are costless due to the linearity
of the primitives. Communication complexity will mostly be measured by the
number of secure multiplications performed. The number of secure comparisons
will also be used to explain the difference of efficiency observed in practice.
Following the tradition, we will write [x] to address the version of x stored se-
curely by FABB and [A] to address a secret shared array [A] = ([a1], [a2], ..., [an]).
Traditional indexing is written [A](i). Oblivious indexing is written [A]([i])
because it is obtained by using a shared unary index of the same size as the
array (see Chapter 3). We will denote the secure arithmetic operations on secret
values in the natural way, e.g., [z] ← [x] + [y] for the addition of two secrets.
The actual protocol implementing these operations depends on the details of
the realization of this functionality. Numerous MPC schemes can be used for
that purpose depending on the security model that is appropriate. For example,
the schemes of Goldreich et al. [4] and Chaum et al. [6] or, for more recent
approaches those of Bendlin et al. [53] and Damg˚ard et al. [54], [55].
In this thesis, we work in the honest-but-curious model. The adversary can
control up to nc = b(n− 1)/2c = 1 player. The corrupted player follows the
protocol but tries to learn as much as possible about the inputs of the other
parties.

Chapter 3
Unary Representation
In this chapter, we introduce a different way to represent integer values: we
represent them as unary counters. This representation will be used for a specific
secure sorting algorithm in Chapter 4 and for a secure single-source shortest
path algorithm in Chapter 6. Chapter 5 does not use a unary notation explicitly
but uses an idea of the same flavour.
The goal of this chapter is to introduce some basics about this notation. We
illustrate the main advantages and drawbacks of dealing with a unary represen-
tation. Using a unary notation helps obliviously performing some important
operations like indexing. However, it often increases the complexity.
Section 3.1 defines unary counters and shows how useful they are in a secure
setting. Section 3.2 describes some basic operations with unary counters like
updating an element at a shared position in an array or computing the minimum
of a list along with its index. Finally, Section 3.3 gives some interesting
applications of unary counters. For example, we present a knapsack algorithm
where the unary notation does not come with an asymptotic overhead.
3.1 Unary Counters
A unary counter of i is an array consisting of all 0’s except for the ith position
that is 1. The length of the array depends on the size of the domain that is the
size of the interval. For example, the unary counter of the integer value i = 3
in an interval of size n = 5 would be i = (0 0 0 1 0). In a shared form, it
is written as [i] = ([0] [0] [0] [1] [0]).
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The way a unary counter is constructed from a shared integer value has been
described by Reistad and Toft [56]. It is similar to the evaluation of a symmetric
Boolean function described by Damg˚ard et al. [57]. The construction uses n
public Lagrange polynomials of degree n − 1 (with n the size of the unary
representation). For example with n = 5, the first polynomial interpolates
the points ((0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0)), the second polynomial the points
((0, 0), (1, 1), (2, 0), (3, 0), (4, 0)) and so on. As these polynomials are public,
we only need to compute the powers of the integer value i: i, ..., in−1 using a
prefix-product. After this, it is costless to evaluate each Lagrange polynomial in
i. The final complexity for constructing a unary counter from a shared integer
value is equivalent to a prefix-product of n− 1 terms.
Unary counters are useful to access an element in an array obliviously. We only
need to express the index i as a unary counter. Suppose we have an array [A]
of size n, the shared index is written [i] and is also of size n. Then, accessing
an element at a shared index position [i] is written [A]([i]) and corresponds to
the computation of a dot product:
[A]([i]) =
n−1∑
j=0
[A](j) · [i](j)
Accessing an element with a shared index requires n secure multiplications
(linear overhead), that may be performed in parallel.
Thanks to the unary representation, we can perform an equality test with a dot
product. It costs again n multiplications. However, it is convenient for small n
because a product costs less than an equality test.
[x] = ([3]
?
= [3]) → [x] = ([0] [0] [0] [1] [0]) ·

[0]
[0]
[0]
[1]
[0]

Finally, the integer value of i may be computed again as
i =
n−1∑
j=0
[i](j) · j.
The multiplications between the shared values [i](j) and the public value j are
all local and have thus no cost.
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Unary counters have been used, amongst others, by Toft to solve linear pro-
grams [58], by Launchbury et al. to develop secure lookup tables [59] and by
Aly et al. to solve combinatorial graph problems securely [2].
3.2 Unary Operations
Let us describe some basic examples of operations on vectors of shared values.
The update of a shared value with a public index is trivial and has no overhead
compared to the non-secure version.
However, the update of a shared value with a private index (Protocol 1) has a
linear overhead. Indeed, to update an element of a vector privately, we have
to pass on the whole vector to avoid leaking information. This function uses
therefore n multiplications with n equal to the length of the vector.
Protocol 1: Update an element in a shared list and at a shared position.
Input: A list [A] of length n, a shared index [i] of length n, a shared
value [x].
Output: The list [A] with the update [A]([i]) = [x].
1 for j ← 1 to n do
2 [A](j)← [A](j) + [i](j) · ([x]− [A](j));
3 end
4 return [A];
Protocol 2 obliviously increments a shared index: the index is only incremented
by 1 if inc = 1. For example, update-index([i]=([0],[1],[0],[0],[0]), inc=[1])
returns ([0],[0],[1],[0],[0]) and update_index([i] = ([0], [1], [0], [0], [0]), inc = [0])
returns ([0], [1], [0], [0], [0]). The method uses n multiplications where n is the
length of the vector [i]. It also has a linear overhead compared to a non-secure
version.
Protocol 2: Increment a shared index if the increment is 1.
Input: A shared index [i] and a shared increment [inc].
Output: The index [i] is incremented if inc = [1].
1 for j ← n− 1 to 1 do
2 [i](j)← [i](j)+ [inc] ·([i](j − 1)− [i](j));
3 end
4 [i](0)← (1-[inc]) ·[i](0);
5 return [i];
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Protocol 3 has been introduced by Toft to obtain the minimal value out of a
vector of shared values [58]. It securely computes a share of the minimal value,
[min], along with a share of its index, [i]. The protocol uses O(n) comparisons
and multiplications. Its overall round complexity is O(log(n)) rounds.
Protocol 3: binarymin. Compute the minimal element in O(log(n))
rounds and O(n) comparisons.
Input: A list [A] of length n with n a power of 2.
Output: The minimum [min] of [A] along with its index [i].
1 if n = 1 then
2 [min]← [A](0);
3 [i]← [1];
4 return([min], [i]);
5 else
6 for j ← 0 to n/2− 1 do
7 [B](j)← [A](2 · j) < [A](2 · j + 1);
8 [A’](j)← [B](j) · ([A](2 · j)− [A](2 · j + 1)) + [A](2 · j + 1);
9 end
10 ([min], [i’])← binarymin([A′]);
11 for j ← 0 to n/2− 1 do
12 [i](2 · j)← [B](j) · [i’](j);
13 [i](2 · j + 1)← (1− [B](j)) · [i’](j);
14 end
15 return([min], [i]);
16 end
These protocols will be used in various sorting and graph protocols.
3.3 Applications
Unary representations have important advantages. For example, it enables
checking the number of occurrences of a given value x in a private array easily and
obliviously. If x is public it can even be computed without any communication
between the parties. This is achieved through a dot product between the private
array and the unary index of x. It gives a share of 0 if x is not in the array and
a share of the number of occurrences otherwise. The cost is very low: n parallel
multiplications. These multiplications are local if x is public.
Some NP-complete problems, like the knapsack problem can be solved thanks to
a pseudo-polynomial algorithm [60],[61],[62]. These algorithms are polynomial
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in the unary size of one variable. For example, Protocol 4 describes a pseudo-
polynomial 0/1 knapsack with dynamic programming. In this example, the list
[V] of the values of the n goods is private while the list W of the weights of the
n goods is public. As we have a public structure, we do not need to hide the
access pattern. This setting makes sense in the case of a public budget where
parties support different projects with a known cost but wish to keep secret the
valuation they give to their project. Interestingly, this pseudo-polynomial time
algorithm already uses a table M whose length corresponds to the knapsack
weight. In this case, no overhead occurs using a unary notation.
Protocol 4: Pseudo-polynomial 0/1 knapsack with dynamic programming.
Input: A private list [V] of the values of the n goods, a public list W of
the weights of the n goods.
Output: The table [M].
1 for i← 1 to n do
2 for j ← 0 to W do
3 if W (i) ≤ j then
4 [M](i, j) = max([M](i− 1, j), [M](i− 1, j −W (i)) + [V](i));
5 else
6 [M](i, j) = [M](i− 1, j);
7 end
8 end
9 end

Part II
Secure MPC Applications

Chapter 4
Secure Multi-Party Sorting
Algorithms
Sorting is a well-studied, yet fundamental problem in algorithms. It can be used
in numerous straightforward applications like organizing a library or displaying
the list of registered voters to an election but it is also a core subroutine for
many algorithms and non-obvious applications, for example, in supply-chain
management and graph theory.
The goal of this chapter is to present secure multi-party sorting protocols that
can be used as such or as building blocks for secure applications as well as to
illustrate the fundamental problems that arise when classical algorithms have
to be solved securely. Our secure protocols relies on previous work on MPC
and on traditional sorting algorithms.
Section 4.1 describes our contributions and the related works. Section 4.2
introduces sorting networks and presents the way we used them to achieve
secure sorting. The implementation prototype of the Odd-even merge sort
network in an MPC setting is described in details. Section 4.3 describes how we
sort integers represented by unary counters. We explore two different settings,
the sorting of distinct input values (single-input values) and the classical sorting
without any multiplicity constraint (multiple-value inputs). These two different
settings lead to quite different efficiency results. Finally, Section 4.4 compares
the two approaches of sorting networks and unary sorting and draws conclusions.
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4.1 Preliminaries
4.1.1 Our Contributions
This chapter provides a secure implementation of a classical sorting network. It
shows that there is no overhead linked to security when using sorting networks.
This is possible thanks to the input-independent structure of sorting networks.
Our implementation fits perfectly with the theoretic complexity. Therefore, we
used it to benchmark our other sorting algorithms.
We detail two algorithms that sort integers expressed in a unary representation.
These protocols offer a good alternative to the existing solutions. They can be
used as primitives for more complex algorithms using a unary representation.
It avoids extra costs of changing the representation of the integers. Our unary
sorting protocols do not use comparisons to sort integers. Finally, we compare
the sorting network approach and the unary representation approach. We
describe when it is preferable to use one solution or the other.
4.1.2 Related Works
A lot of traditional sorting algorithms have been developed. We briefly mention
some famous comparison-based sorting algorithms. In 1960, Hoare developed
the Quicksort algorithm [63]. Then, the algorithm was studied thoroughly and
improved by Sedgewick [64], [65]. In 1964, Williams invented the Heapsort
algorithm [66] that was improved the same year by Floyd [67]. In 1973, Neumann
proposed a sorting by merging algorithm [68]. All these sorting algorithms
based on comparisons cannot perform better than O(n · log n).
Since their introduction by Batcher in 1964 [69], sorting networks have been
an open research problem. Nevertheless, there has been little improvement in
practical and generic sorting networks. To cite but a few, Ajtai et al. proposed
the AKS sorting network which is impractical but achieves optimal asymptotic
complexities [70]. Parberry proposed the pairwise sorting network with the
same complexity as Batcher’s Odd-even merge sort [71]. Networks that almost
correctly sort the inputs have also been proposed as well as networks tailored
for a predefined (and usually small) number of inputs [68]. We do not address
these networks here because they do not fit our purpose. Instead, we use the
well-known Odd-even merge sort to benchmark our protocols.
Unary counters have been used by Launchbury et al. to develop secure lookup
tables [59] and by Toft to solve linear programs [58]. They have also been
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used by Aly et al. to compute a shortest path in a graph securely [2]. In the
present work, we use unary counters to achieve sorting protocols without any
comparison.
Goodrich described a randomized and data-oblivious version of the Shellsort
algorithm that achieves optimal O(n · log n) size and O(log n) depth [72]. It
succeeds in sorting any given input permutation but does not guarantee an
exact sorting, it only sorts inputs with a very high probability.
In their paper, Secure Multi-Party Sorting and Applications [73], Jo´nsson et al.
proposed an MPC sorting protocol based on techniques from sorting networks.
They implemented and evaluated it on the Sharemind MPC platform. Their
protocol is of independent interest but can also be used as a building block
in the weighted set intersection problem, for example. Our Odd-even merge
sort implementation relies on techniques similar to those introduced by Jo´nsson
et al. Our goal is not to provide a novel sorting protocol based on sorting
networks but to compare different sorting networks, to select the best one and
then to provide a basis to evaluate the ranges of efficiency of our unary sorting
protocols. We choose to implement them on a more generic platform: our
protocols can be used for more than 3 parties while Sharemind only enables
exactly 3 parties. This restriction might be annoying in an auction process, for
example. Moreover, Sharemind only deals with passive security.
In the paper, Generic Constant-Round Oblivious Sorting Algorithm for MPC
[74], Zhang introduced two secure sorting protocols. The first one is based
on Seward’s counting sort algorithm. The algorithm counts the number of
occurrences for each possible value and the sorted sequence is then constructed
using these counts [62]. As it does not use any comparison, the lower bound is
no more O(n · log n) like it is for all the comparison-based sorting algorithms.
If all the n inputs are in an interval of size b, the complexity is O(b · n). The
algorithm uses the constant-round bit-decomposition protocol and unbounded
fan-in AND gate of Damg˚ard et al. [57]. The second protocol introduced by
Zhang is based on Arulanandham et al.’s bead sort [75], [76]. It sorts positive
integers in a kind of natural way. The positive integers are represented as beads
attached to rods. At the beginning, they appear as suspended in the air before
sliding down attracted by gravity and sorting by themselves. Arulanandham
et al. used a special hardware to simulate the falling of the beads while Zhang
reproduced it in software using again counters. The complexity is O(b · n)
comparisons.
Hamada et al. proposed a practically efficient multi-party sorting protocol based
on the Quicksort algorithm [77]. They overcome the issues related to the data-
dependent algorithms by using an oblivious shuﬄe on the inputs before sorting.
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This shuﬄe avoids privacy leakage when revealing the result of comparisons.
More generally, this approach can be used to convert non-oblivious comparison
sort algorithms into their secure MPC counterpart.
In a second paper, Hamada et al. presented an even more efficient sorting
algorithm based on the radix sort algorithm [78]. The radix sort algorithm sorts
fixed-length integers by iteratively applying a digit-wise stable sort from the
least to the most significant digit [62]. The oblivious radix sort of Hamada et
al. also uses a shuﬄe before sorting and is particularly efficient if the number of
parties and the size of the underlying field are small.
Bogdanov et al. have recently provided an overview of the existing types of
methods to perform oblivious sorting [79]. They distinguished the constructions
based on sorting networks [73], on bitwise representations [74] and on oblivious
shuﬄing [77]. They also proposed two optimization directions. The first one
is to use vector operations to reduce the number of sub-protocol invocations.
They described a naive comparison sort where all comparisons are done in one
round but where each input is compared with every other input. They claimed
that this parallelizable protocol can work faster for small input vectors than
sequential protocols due to a smaller network latency. The second optimization
direction is to use sorting networks with bitwise shared representations. Most
of the time, the technique used for comparison is to first compute the sharing
of the values’ individual bits and then to execute the comparison on the bitwise
representation. For multiple comparisons on the same values, as it is the case
for sorting, it might be more efficient to compute once the bitwise representation
and to perform all comparisons on these expressions.
Table 4.1 summarizes the complexity of the aforementioned protocols. The
variable n represents the number of inputs and b the range of these inputs.
4.2 Secure Sorting using Sorting Networks
Secure sorting requires data-independent operations. Unfortunately, most
sorting algorithms (Quicksort, Shellsort,...) exploit the outcome of previous
comparisons to compute the next ones: they are adaptive or data dependent. It
is not possible to use them as such to develop secure protocols. However, sorting
networks (Bitonic sort, Odd-even merge sort,...) use a sequence of comparisons
set in advance: they are oblivious or data independent. For this reason, they
are good candidates for the design of secure sorting algorithms.
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Sorting protocol
Number of
rounds
Complexity
Randomized Shellsort O(log n) O(n · log n) comparisons
Odd-even merge sort O(log2 n) O(n · log2 n) comparisons
Counting Sort O(1) O(b+ n) bit-decompositions
+ O(b · n) fan-in AND gates
Arrayless bead Sort O(1) O(b · n) comparisons
Quicksort (average/worst)
O(log n) /
O(n)
O(n · log n) / O(n2)
comparisons
Radix Sort O(1) O(n · log n) comparisons
Single-value unary Sort O(b) O(b · n) multiplications
Multiple-value unary Sort O(b+ n) O((b+ n)2) multiplications
Table 4.1: Comparison of the current oblivious sorting protocols.
4.2.1 Sorting Networks
Sorting networks were introduced by Batcher in 1964 [69]. They are made up
of wires and comparators. Figure 4.1 shows a comparator connecting two wires
and sorting their value: the minimum value comes out on the upper wire while
the maximum value comes out on the lower one. A sorting network is a set of
predefined comparators that will sort all possible inputs. Execution is therefore
completely oblivious to the inputs.
a min(a, b)
b max(a, b)
Figure 4.1: A comparator in a sorting network.
Two different efficiency metrics are used to evaluate a sorting network. The
network depth, also called the network delay, is the number of rounds needed
to sort inputs. The network size, also called the network cost, is the total
number of comparators in the network. Table 4.2 shows three sorting networks
described by Batcher [80] with their asymptotic complexities. Bubble sort is
a basic sorting network with an O(n2) depth and an O(n2) size. Bitonic sort
and Odd-even merge sort both have an O(log2 n) depth and an O(n · log2 n)
size. Although the asymptotic size of both networks is equal, the exact number
of comparators is different: n · (log2 n+ log n)/4 comparators for the Bitonic
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sort and n · (log2 n − log n + 4)/4 − 1 comparators for the Odd-even merge
sort. It corresponds to 28160 comparators for a 1024-input Bitonic sort and to
24063 comparators for a 1024-input Odd-even merge sort. This difference in
the “constants” matters with regards to practical results.
In 1983, Ajtai et al. presented the AKS sorting network with an O(log n) depth
and an O(n · log n) size [70]. Although this network achieves optimal asymptotic
complexities, it is unusable in practice due to its high hidden constants: it is
competitive as from 26000 inputs. In 1992, Parberry presented the Pairwise
sorting network, the first sorting network to be competitive with the Odd-even
merge sort for all input values [71]. They both have exactly the same size and
depth. To the best of our knowledge, Parberry’s Pairwise sorting network and
Batcher’s Odd-even merge sort are the most efficient networks to sort n inputs
with practical values of n and n > 16 without any error.
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Figure for n = 8 Network depth Network size
(Number of rounds)
(Number of
comparisons)
Bubble sort O(n) O(n2)
Bitonic sort
logn·(logn+1)
2
= O(log2 n)
n·(log2 n+logn)
4
= O(n · log2 n)
Odd-even
merge sort
logn·(logn+1)
2
= O(log2 n)
n·(log2 n−logn+4)
4 − 1
= O(n · log2 n)
Table 4.2: Comparison of three well-known sorting networks.
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4.2.2 Protocol and Implementation Prototype
Our protocols are built on top of the arithmetic black-box functionality FABB of
Damg˚ard and Nielsen [51]. It allows computing the complexity with regards to
the number of multiplications and comparisons performed. We refer to Section
2.5 for more details. As usual, the notation [x]q or more simply [x] represents a
share of x over Zq with q prime. The notation [X] stands for a list or a table of
shares. Finally, the notation [a < b] represents a share of 1 if a < b and a share
of 0 if a > b.
Sorting networks have a predefined structure and are based on a unique element
(a comparator). The comparator is the only element that needs to be secured.
An oblivious comparator can be achieved, among others, by the following
compare-exchange function:
[x] = [a < b]
[min(a, b)] = [x][a] + (1− [x])[b]
[max(a, b)] = [x][b] + (1− [x])[a]
This function uses one secure comparison and four secure multiplications. How-
ever, the multiplication of two shares is a costly primitive, compared to the
addition of two shares that comes for free in MPC (no communication cost). In
order to use only one comparison and one multiplication, this function can be
rewritten as follows:
[x] = [a < b]
[y] = [x] ∗ [a− b]
[min(a, b)] = [b] + [y]
[max(a, b)] = [a]− [y]
The implementation is realized thanks to the Virtual Ideal Functionality Frame-
work (http://viff.dk) developed by Geisler et al. at Aarhus University [48].
For the comparison protocol, we use Damg˚ard et al.’s protocol [57] improved by
Reistad and Toft [81]. We only present our prototype of the Odd-even merge
sort network (see Figure 4.2). A sort function based on the Bitonic sort is
provided as a part of the VIFF framework. Although the number of rounds is
equal, the Odd-even merge sort outperforms the Bitonic sort in terms of the
exact number of comparisons.
The odd-even merge sort algorithm is based on a merge algorithm that merges
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Figure 4.2: Odd-even merge sort network for 8 inputs.
two sorted halves of a sequence to a completely sorted sequence. The sorting is
achieved by recursive applications of the merge algorithm.
The core function of the secure sorting based on the Odd-even merge sort is
identical to a traditional implementation, except for the comparator block: it is
replaced by the secure exchange function.
def s e cu r e odd even merge so r t ( s e l f , array ) :
# I f x conta in s more than one element , s p l i t x in the middle ,
# so r t r e c u r s i v e l y the upper and the lowest h a l f
# be f o r e f i n a l l y merging them
def odd even merge sort ( x ) :
i f len ( x )<=1:
return x
else :
f i r s t = odd even merge sor t ( x [ : len ( x ) / 2 ] )
second = odd even merge sor t ( x [ len ( x ) / 2 : ] )
return odd even merge ( f i r s t + second )
# Form r e c u r s i v e l y the even and odd subsequences
def odd even merge (x ) :
i f len ( x ) == 2 :
x [ 0 ] , x [ 1 ] = ob l iv ious compare (x [ 0 ] , x [ 1 ] )
return x
else :
# even subsequence
e = odd even merge ( ex t r a c t (0 , x ) )
# odd subsequence
o = odd even merge ( ex t r a c t (1 , x ) )
r e s u l t = i n t e r l e a v e ( e , o )
return odd even compare ( r e s u l t )
# Extract e i t h e r the odd or the even subsequence
# depending on the s t a r t va lue
def ex t r a c t ( s t a r t , x ) :
r e s = range ( len ( x ) /2)
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ind = range ( s t a r t , len ( x ) ,2 )
for i in ind : r e s [ i /2]=x [ i ]
return r e s
# In s e r t the odd and the even subsequences
# a f t e r the ob l i v i o u s comparisons
def i n t e r l e a v e (x , y ) :
r e s = range ( len ( x )+len ( y ) )
for i in range ( len ( x ) ) :
r e s [ 2∗ i ]=x [ i ] ; r e s [ 2∗ i +1] = y [ i ]
return r e s
# Perform the l a s t comparison step
def odd even compare (x ) :
for i in range (1 , len ( x ) −1 ,2) :
x [ i ] , x [ i +1] = ob l iv ious compare (x [ i ] , x [ i +1])
return x
# Perform the ob l i v i o u s exchange ( compare−swap )
def ob l iv ious compare ( i , j ) :
b = i <= j
b a i a j = b ∗ ( i − j )
return j + b a i a j , i − b a i a j
newarray = odd even merge sor t ( array )
return newarray
Listing 4.1: Odd-even merge sort
Figure 4.3 shows in grey the experimental running time of this Odd-even
merge sort prototype. The black curve corresponds to the theoretic number of
comparators multiplied by their execution time (0.12 second for one comparator).
Times correspond to computations between three entities (threshold = 1) on
a single machine. Figure 4.3 shows that our practical results perfectly fit the
expected complexity curve.
In this scenario, there is no extra cost due to the passage to the secure solution.
The asymptotic complexities are the same as the one described in Table 4.2.
The extra costs only come from the higher cost of the basic secure operations
like multiplication.
Except for some computations, the secret sharing for example, comparators are
the only operation to take part to our protocol. Our comparator is composed
of one comparison and one multiplication. The secure comparison protocol for
comparing secret variables of l-bit size uses O(l) secure multiplications. With
l = 32 and passive security, one comparison is achieved with 165 multiplications.
It results in our secure Odd-even merge sort using 165 · (n·(log2 n−logn+4)4 − 1)
secure multiplications. Therefore, we have a strong interest in finding a sorting
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Figure 4.3: Running time of our secure Odd-even merge sort prototype.
method, maybe less efficient in a traditional setting, which avoids the costly
comparisons.
4.3 Secure Sorting using Unary Counters
We propose two protocols using unary counters. Both of them sort inputs
in a given interval. The first one only sorts different inputs (unary sort with
single-value inputs) while the second one admits inputs multiplicity (unary sort
with multiple-value inputs).
4.3.1 Unary Sorting with Single-Value Inputs
Let us show an example of the prototype where we chose n = 4 and b = 5. The
list ([2] [0] [1] [4]) becomes, in a unary representation, the array:
[A] =

[0] [0] [1] [0] [0]
[1] [0] [0] [0] [0]
[0] [1] [0] [0] [0]
[0] [0] [0] [0] [1]

The algorithm sums each column of the array [A] in sum_vector, that is
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sum_vector = ([1] [1] [1] [0] [1]). For each position i in sum_vector, a
share of 1 indicates that the value i is in the list, while a share of 0 indicates that
the value i is not in the list. The sorted_vector will contain the sorted list
after the execution of the algorithm. It is initialized with shares of 0. The index
vector is initialized with shares of 0 except index(0) that is initialized with a
share of 1. This vector maintains the current position in the sorted_vector,
that is the position where the next sorted element has to be obliviously inserted.
To obtain the sorted list, we need to obliviously extract the positions that contain
a share of 1 and eliminate the positions that contain a share of 0. It is achieved
using the loop at Line 15. The loop goes through all the elements i in the
interval (of size b). At each iteration, it inserts a share of i in a temporary vector
at the index given by the index vector. If sum_vector(i) = [1], it obliviously
updates the sorted_vector and obliviously increments the index. Conversely,
if sum_vector(i) = [0], it does not change neither the sorted_vector nor the
index but every entry is updated with a different share of the same value to
prevent the leakage of information. In our example, the algorithm outputs the
sorted list [A] = ([0] [1] [2] [4]).
1 def una r y s o r t s i n g l e v a l u e ( s e l f , matrix ) :
2
3 # Number o f e lements to s o r t
4 n = matrix . shape [ 0 ]
5 # Size o f the i n t e r v a l ( s i z e o f the unary r ep r e s en t a t i on )
6 b = matrix . shape [ 1 ]
7 # Vector where the i−th entry i s the sum of the i−th column o f
the input matrix .
8 sum vector = matrix .sum( ax i s=0)
9 # I n i t i a l i z e the vec to r that w i l l conta in the so r t ed l i s t with
share s o f 0 ( s e l f . z e ro i s not de s c r ibed here ) .
10 s o r t e d v e c t o r = [ s e l f . z e ro ]∗n
11 # I n i t i a l i z e the index vec to r that w i l l maintain the cur rent
po s i t i o n in the s o r t e d v e c t o r ( where the next so r t ed
element has to be i n s e r t e d ) .
12 index = [ s e l f . z e ro ]∗n
13 index [0 ]= s e l f . one
14
15 for i in range (b) :
16 # The cond i t i on i s 1 i f the re i s a c t ua l l y an element at
the i−th entry and i s 0 othe rwi s e .
17 cond i t i on = sum vector [ i ]
18 # In s e r t a share o f i at the index entry . n mult .
19 temp vector = s e l f . upda t e v e c t o r p r i va t e ( s o r t ed vec to r ,
index , i )
20 # ‘ ‘Remove ’ ’ o b l i v i o u s l y the j u s t i n s e r t e d element i f the
cond i t i on i s 0 ( conc r e t e ly , i f the cond i t i on i s 0 , the
update in temp vector i s not taken in to account ) . n
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Figure 4.4: Running time of our unary sort prototype with b = 512.
mult .
21 s o r t e d v e c t o r = ( temp vector−s o r t e d v e c t o r ) ∗ cond i t i on+
so r t ed v e c t o r
22 # Increment the po s i t i o n i f the ( p r i va t e ) cond i t i on i s 1 .
n mult .
23 index = s e l f . update index ( index , cond i t i on )
24
25 return s o r t e d v e c t o r
Listing 4.2: Unary sort for single-value inputs
Lines 19, 21 and 23 perform each n multiplications and the loop is executed
b times (with n the number of elements to sort and b the size of the interval).
The prototype requires 3.b.n multiplications.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 show the practical results we get compared to the expected
theoretic complexity.
4.3.2 Unary Sorting with Multiple-Value Inputs
This second algorithm is based on the previous one. We use the same variables
and introduce an extra public values vector. It contains the values 0,1,2,...,b-1.
The next values to insert in the sorted_vector are picked among them. We
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Figure 4.5: Running time of our unary sort prototype with b = n.
also introduce the private vector values_index. The vector maintains the
current position (index) in the values vector.
The sorted list is recursively constructed by the loop at Line 20 of the fol-
lowing algorithm. If current_multiplicity ≥ [1], it obliviously updates
(decrements) the sum vector, updates the sorted_vector and increments the
sorted_vector_index. However, it does not increment the values_index
(the non-zero multiplicity indicates that might have to insert multiple times
the same value). Conversely, if current_multiplicity = [0], it updates the
values_index.
1 def una ry s o r t mu l t i p l e v a l u e ( s e l f , matrix ) :
2
3 # Number o f e lements to s o r t
4 n = matrix . shape [ 0 ]
5 # Size o f the i n t e r v a l ( s i z e o f the unary r ep r e s en t a t i on )
6 b = matrix . shape [ 1 ]
7 # Vector where the i−th entry i s the sum of the i−th column o f
the input matrix .
8 sum vector = matrix .sum( ax i s=0)
9 # I n i t i a l i z e the s o r t e d v e c t o r with share s o f 0 ( s e l f . z e ro and
s e l f . one not de s c r ib ed here ) . This vec to r w i l l l a t e r
conta in the so r t ed l i s t .
10 s o r t e d v e c t o r = [ s e l f . z e ro ]∗n
11 # I n i t i a l i z e the s o r t e d v e c t o r i nd ex vec to r with share s o f 0
at a l l e n t r i e s except the f i r s t entry . This vec to r maintain
the cur rent p o s i t i o n in the s o r t e d v e c t o r ( the index where
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the next so r t ed element has to be i n s e r t e d ) .
12 s o r t e d v e c t o r i nd ex = [ s e l f . z e ro ]∗n
13 s o r t e d v e c t o r i nd ex [0 ]= s e l f . one
14 # I n i t i a l i z e the va lue s vec to r with the va lue s 0 , 1 , 2 , . . . , b−1.
The next element to i n s e r t in the s o r t e d v e c t o r i s p icked
in t h i s l i s t .
15 va lue s = arange (0 , b , dtype=ob j e c t )
16 # I n i t i a l i z e the va lue s i ndex vec to r with share s o f 0 except
f o r the f i r s t entry . The vec to r maintains the cur rent
po s i t i o n ( index ) in the va lue s vec to r .
17 va lue s i ndex = [ s e l f . z e ro ]∗b
18 va lue s i ndex [ 0 ] = s e l f . one
19
20 for i in range (n+b) :
21 # Values index i s p r i va t e but the vec to r va lue s i s pub l i c .
Mu l t i p l i c a t i o n s are ‘ ‘ f r e e ’ ’ .
22 cu r r en t va l u e = dot ( values , va lu e s i ndex )
23 # b mult
24 c u r r e n t mu l t i p l i c i t y = dot ( sum vector , va lu e s i ndex )
25 # Set the cond i t i on to 0 i f the cur rent mu l t i p l i c i t y i s 0 .
Set the cond i t i on to 1 otherwi s e ( i t means the re i s at
l e a s t one occurence o f the cur rent va lue to put in the
so r t ed l i s t ) . n mult .
26 cond i t i on = 1− s e l f . polynQ ( cu r r e n t mu l t i p l i c i t y , n )
27
28 # Update sum vector i f the cond i t i on i s 1 . 2∗b mult .
29 temp vector 1 = s e l f . upda t e v e c t o r p r i va t e ( sum vector ,
va lues index , c u r r e n t mu l t i p l i c i t y −1)
30 sum vector = ( temp vector 1−sum vector ) ∗ cond i t i on+
sum vector
31
32 # Add cu r r en t va l u e in s o r t e d v e c t o r i f the cond i t i on i s
1 . 2∗n mult .
33 temp vector 2 = s e l f . upda t e v e c t o r p r i va t e ( s o r t ed ve c to r ,
s o r t ed ve c t o r i ndex , cu r r en t va l u e )
34 s o r t e d v e c t o r = ( temp vector 2−s o r t e d v e c t o r ) ∗ cond i t i on+
so r t ed v e c t o r
35
36 # Increment the s o r t e d v e c t o r i nd ex i f the cond i t i on i s 1 .
n mult .
37 s o r t e d v e c t o r i nd ex = s e l f . update index (
s o r t ed ve c t o r i ndex , cond i t i on )
38 # Increment the va lue s i ndex i f c ond i t i on i s 0 . b mult .
39 va lue s i ndex = s e l f . update index ( va lues index , 1−cond i t i on
)
40
41 return s o r t e d v e c t o r
Listing 4.3: Unary sort for multiple-value inputs
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The function polynQ evaluates the function P (x) which returns 1 if x = 0 and
0 if 0 < x < multmax.
P (x) =
(x− 1) · (x− 2) · (x− 3) · · · · (x−multmax)
(−1) · (−2) · (−3) · · · · (−multmax)
# The func t i on r e tu rn s 1 i f x = 0 and 0 otherw i se . multmax mult .
def polynQ ( s e l f , x , multmax ) :
r e s u l t = 1
div = 1
for i in range (1 ,multmax+1) :
r e s u l t = r e s u l t ∗(x−i )
d iv = div∗(− i )
diva = s e l f . Zp( div )
invd iv = inv e r t ( diva )
return ( r e s u l t ∗ i nvd iv )
Lines 22 , 27, 28 and 37 perform b secure multiplications while Lines 24, 31, 32
and 35 perform n secure multiplications. The loop is executed n+ b times. The
prototype requires 4 · (n+ b)2 multiplications.
4.3.3 Discussion
As seen in previous sections, theory and practice fit quite well. Therefore, we
compare the theoretic complexities. Figure 4.6 shows the ranges of usability
of our unary sorting for single-value inputs. The unary sort with single-input
values of an interval size of b = n is very interesting to determine these ranges
because it gives the best results we can hope with the unary approach. We can
see that it is useless to use a unary sorting with more than 1500 values. In that
case, the odd-even merge sort always outperforms the unary sort. With less
than 1500 inputs, the ranges of interest depend on the size of the interval b. For
example, with a size b = 256, a unary sort approach is worthy with input size
20 ≤ b ≤ 1500. For less than 20 inputs, it becomes too onerous to compute a
unary representation of size 256 compared to the few computations needed by
a sorting network. However, if the inputs are in a smaller interval, for example,
b = 64, it is still interesting. If we consider the memory usage and work on
GF(256), this approach is worth interest even in different gaps.
Figure 4.7 shows the ranges of usability of our unary sorting for multiple-value
inputs. The unary sort with multiple-value inputs is only competitive for very
small intervals of size 32 or 64. However, once again if memory is the most
important constraint, the multiple-value inputs protocol is interesting even for
larger values.
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Figure 4.6: Benchmark of Unary sort with single-value inputs and Oems (holds
for a comparison costing 165 multiplications).
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Figure 4.7: Benchmark of Unary sort with multiple-value inputs and Oems
(holds for a comparison costing 165 multiplications).
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4.4 Conclusion
When designing secure algorithms, the first obstacle is about the different
efficiency metrics: the traditional complexity metrics do not transpose to secure
computations. For example, it is more expensive, by more than two orders of
magnitude, to compare values than to multiply them. This means that the most
efficient traditional algorithms might not be the most efficient once adapted,
when possible, to the secure setting. The second main difficulty is the leakage
by data structure. Most algorithms have an execution flow that depends on
the data that are manipulated. Control flow happens as a function of data
that must be kept secret (the result of branching or loop exit conditions, for
instance).
A secure sorting based on sorting networks is a good choice if we know little
information about the inputs, for example, if we do not know the gap between
the maximum and minimum values or if we do not know if there are or not
repeated inputs. This sorting is also interesting if we need to sort without
any error. It can be used easily as a sub-protocol. The unary sort is a good
alternative if the numbers to sort are concentrated in a very close gap. It can
be quite interesting if we know the distribution of the inputs in advance and if
we can exploit this information. The unary sort offers a practical solution for
small input size given the particular computational metric. Moreover, we can
use it on the field GF(256) due to the fact that we only compute on bits. The
unary sort can therefore be run on devices with not much memory.
Chapter 5
Securely Solving a Fair
Division Problem
Fair division is a well studied problem in game theory. The fair division problem
of cake-cutting consists in dividing a heterogeneous good so that all parties
believe they have received a fair share. The problem is interesting when parties
value the pieces of the heterogeneous good differently. This potentially allows
the k parties to receive more than 1/k of the value of the good according to
their own preferences. Beyond the metaphor of cutting a cake, fair divisions
are advised in a wide variety of situations: to divide goods in an inheritance, to
distribute chores or to split the costs of building a shared road among the users.
The goal of this chapter is to present secure solutions to the cake-cutting
problem. These cryptographic solutions address important shortcomings of
traditional game-theoretic procedures. Traditional procedures disclose some of
the parties’ preferences and offer other parties the possibility to dynamically
adjust their behaviour in order to obtain unfair advantages.
Section 5.1 describes our contributions, the related works in game theory and
the links between cryptography and game theory. Section 5.2 describes the
modelling of the cake-cutting problem, that is the modelling of the parties’
preferences as well as the function that gives an equitable division for two and
for k parties in the presence of a mediator. This section is a main contribution
to the chapter. It shows how to use the cryptographic primitives to solve the
fair division problem. Section 5.3 details the secure cake-cutting protocol and
gives the implementation results. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes and gives some
open problems.
50 Chapter 5. Securely Solving a Fair Division Problem
5.1 Preliminaries
Two different properties are quite useful in division problems: fairness and
efficiency. A division is efficient if no other division is strictly better for at least
one party and as good for the others. The importance of efficiency is obvious
but the perception of fairness is also very important. For example, to divide an
inheritance between siblings, it is important that each sibling does not envy the
share another one has got. Fairness seems more important than efficiency in
this context [82].
Different criteria of fairness can be used to divide a cake. A proportional division
guarantees each of the k parties to receive at least 1/k of the cake according
to his valuation. A division is envy-free if the resource is divided in such a
way that no one will prefer another party’s share. If all the parties get the
same proportion, according to their valuation, the division is called equitable.
Illustrations and detailed definitions of these criteria are widely available in the
literature [83], [84], [85].
Proportionality and envy-freeness are equivalent with only two parties. With
more than two parties, a proportional sharing does not guarantee that the parties
will not be envious. However, an envy-free division always gives the parties
a proportional share. Equitability seems to be a strong criterion of fairness.
However, it must be used together with another criterion: an equitable division
can even fail to be proportional. Equitability implies neither envy-freeness nor
proportionality and none of these properties implies equitability.
5.1.1 Our Contributions
In this chapter, we give a secure multi-party protocol for an equitable cake-
cutting. Contrary to the game-theoretic procedures, our solution preserves
the privacy of the preferences. The parties only learn the final cutting point
that is strictly minimal. Moreover, our solution leads to the high payoffs of a
mediated division by emulating the mediator. Appendix B gives more details
about the expected payoffs of mediated games. Parts of this work were written
in collaboration with C. Petit and O. Pereira and presented at WISSec 2010 [1].
Our protocol is more efficient than generic techniques and, therefore, usable in
practice. There is no known procedure in game theory to achieve, without a
physical mediator, an equitable division of a heterogeneous cake with uncut
pieces. This new result is possible by using MPC to emulate a mediator.
We introduce step functions to model the parties’ preferences because they are
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well appropriate to the restrictions inherent to the secure multi-party protocols.
Furthermore, step functions appear to arbitrarily closely approximate any
reasonable utility function. This class of functions enables us to write an
equitable cake allocation procedure for MPC.
Then, we use the cake allocation procedure in a secure multi-party protocol.
The cake-cutting protocol relies on a secure protocol for comparison [57] and
on a secure protocol for inversion of non integer values [86]. The properties of
the cake-cutting protocol depend on the properties of these building blocks.
In this chapter, we distinguish the 2-party and the k-party cases. We show
the mathematical model in both cases but only detail the secure protocol in
the 2-party case. The k-party secure protocol can easily be deduced from the
mathematical model. There are two major differences for the k-party case. The
solutions are multiple: to each ordering of the players corresponds an equitable
division. The equitability does no longer guarantee proportionality.
5.1.2 Related Works
Many applications of MPC have been developed in the last years. Related works
about these applications can be found in Section 2.4.1. This section briefly
summarizes related works in game theory.
Game theory provides solutions to fair divisions in a lot of interesting cases.
The basic one with two players is “I cut, you choose”. Alice cuts the cake into
two parts she thinks equal and Bob chooses the part with the greatest utility
according to his preferences. This procedure is not equitable and, like all the
game-theoretic procedures, suffers from a lack of secrecy: Bob gets a lot of
information about Alice’s preferences, since Alice cuts the cake into two halves
she considers exactly equal. However, Alice does not know how far Bob prefers
the share he has chosen to the other one. Appendix C describes this game in
more details.
More complex game-theoretic solutions exist for an infinitely divisible cake as
well as for indivisible goods [82]. There are two kinds of procedures: discrete
and continuous moving-knife procedures. Brams and Taylor give an unbounded
discrete procedure for an envy-free division between k players [87]. Brams,
Taylor and Zwicker describe a moving-knife procedure for an envy-free division
between four players [88]. Like “I cut, you choose”, these procedures reveal a lot
of information about the players’ preferences but this disclosure of information
is even more annoying, as it enables the players to adapt their strategy in order
to obtain a bigger piece of cake.
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The presence of a mediator improves and simplifies fair divisions. The players
can privately communicate their preferences to him and he can then suggest a
fair division satisfying all parties. A mediated division reveals nothing about
the players’ preferences except for the information that can be deduced from the
cutting points. Furthermore, such a division potentially leads to much higher
payoffs, that is, the players receive a bigger piece of cake according to their
own valuation. A trusted mediator is, however, not very easy to find and his
existence is unsafe. A person who knows the preferences of each party will focus
all attacks on himself.
Dodis et al. also use cryptographic protocols to solve extensive form games [89].
Appendix B provides a short outline on the standard definitions of game theory.
It shows how a game-theoretic mediator can improve the expected payoffs of the
players. However, the game-theoretic mediator is limited by the rationality of
the parties. Appendix C illustrates these definitions on a cake-cutting problem
(I cut, you choose).
5.1.3 Bridging Cryptogaphy and Game Theory
Bridging cryptography and game theory seems very interesting but challenging
because of their different settings. This research direction was initiated by Dodis
and Rabin [90] and Izmalkov et al. [91]. Table 5.1 summarizes the key differences
between the cryptographic and game-theoretic settings. Katz provides more
details in his report [92].
Cryptography Game theory
Players/Parties totally honest or malicious always rational
Incentive outside the model payoff
Solution drivers secure protocol equilibrium
Privacy goal means
Trusted party in the ideal model in the actual game
Table 5.1: Cryptography and Game Theory Settings.
In cryptography, some players are supposed to follow the protocol honestly
while other malicious players can deviate from it. In the honest-but-curious
model, all players, even the corrupted ones, follow the protocol blindly without
any incentives. In the malicious model, however, the corrupted players may
behave in a completely unexpected and even irrational manner. In game theory,
all players have a rational behaviour: they all follow the protocol only if it is
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in their own and best interest in terms of payoffs. Rationality is a common
knowledge, i.e., players know that all players are rational and use this knowledge
to make their strategic decisions. These different settings are quite difficult to
compare.
In the cryptographic settings, the objective is to achieve a secure protocol
designed to eliminate the trusted party. The functionality of the mediator is
shared among the players and he thus only exists in the ideal model. The goal
of the secure multi-party protocol is to assure the correctness of the outputs
and the privacy of the inputs even when some parties are cheating. In the
game-theoretic settings, the goal is to reach an equilibrium, i.e., a situation
where no player has an incentive to deviate from his strategy. Privacy is a
central issue in cryptography while it is only a means in game theory.
A secure multi-party protocol leaks no information during its execution. The
players can thus not adapt their preferences and the protocol leads to a more
equitable division. We work under the settings of a continuous cake. The
cutting points have therefore non integer values. This is a difficulty because
MPC deals with discrete values.
5.2 Modelling the Cake-Cutting Problem
To achieve a mediated equitable cake division, the players have to express
their preferences in a digital way and to agree on a function that, given their
preferences as input, computes the cutting points as output. Each player
explicitly tells how much he values the different parts of the cake through a
utility function defined on the “cake interval”. We represent the cake by a
given interval of R. Utility functions cannot be general to get a simple analytic
expression of the cutting points.
We express the players’ preferences for the different pieces of cake by a step
function. This is a convenient choice: it is very easy to calculate the integral of
a step function and to approximate more general functions by step functions.
To get a simple analytic expression, we add other assumptions. All the steps of
the function should have the same width and an integer value. The cake should
be valued on [0, N ] with N equal to the number of steps of the step function
(the steps have a width of 1). Adapting the size of the cake to the number
of steps of the function makes it possible to deal with integer values for the
integration: the integral of a utility function on a unitary interval is an integer
value. This simplifies the integration and since secure comparison is possible, it
is not a problem to proceed by parts.
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No one is favoured: all players have the same total utility for the cake. Let
U ∈ R+ be the utility of a player for the whole cake. Moreover, all the utilities
for each interval are supposed to be strictly positive integers.
5.2.1 Equitable Division for 2 Players
In this section, we focus on determining the functions that two players have to
securely evaluate in order to find the cutting point. The inputs of a player are
the values of his N-step function on each interval. The output corresponds to
the cutting point. Equitability is required for the sharing. Every player gets
exactly the same proportion of the cake according to his own valuation.
Let α be the cutting point. The utility function of the first player (P1) is defined
by f1(x) = u1 on [0, 1], f1(x) = u2 on ]1, 2], . . . , f1(x) = uN on ]N − 1, N ].
In the same way, the utility function of the second player (P2) is defined by
f2(x) = v1 on [0, 1], f2(x) = v2 on ]1, 2], . . . , f2(x) = vN on ]N − 1, N ].
Equitability implies that
∫ α
0
f1(x) dx =
∫ N
α
f2(x) dx.
The left piece of cake is arbitrarily allocated to P1 and vice-versa for P2. This
is not a problem since the division is equitable and there are only two players.
Either both players are happy with their share, or they both receive less than a
half of the cake (according to their own valuation) and they envy each other.
In this case, they exchange their parts. The equitable division for two players
is therefore also proportional and envy-free. The following propositions show
the existence and uniqueness of the cutting point for two players.
Proposition 1. The cutting point is unique for two players.
Proof. There are two different orderings of the two players. Let us take the
ordering P1 - P2. Define the functions g1(α) :=
∫ α
0
f1(x) dx and g2(α) :=∫ N
α
f2(x) dx. Since f1 and f2 are bounded, g1 and g2 must be continuous. Now,
since g1(0) = 0 and g1(N) > 0 while g2(0) > 0 and g2(N) = 0, there must
be a value α ∈ [0, N ] such that g1(α) = g2(α). Moreover, since f1 and f2 are
strictly positive functions, g1 and g2 must be strictly monotonic, and the point
α satisfying g1(x) = g2(x) must be unique.
Since g1(N) = g2(0), the cutting point α also gives an equitable division for the
ordering P2 - P1 (with a utility U −m for each player) and since we know that
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α
P1
P2
m U −m
U −m m
(a) Ordering P1 - P2
α
P2
P1
U −m m
m U −m
(b) Ordering P2 - P1
Figure 5.1: Equitable divisions for the two different players’ orderings.
the equitable division is unique, we also find the equitable division corresponding
to the ordering P2 - P1. Figure 5.1 provides an illustration of the proof.
Proposition 2. An equitable, envy-free and proportional division always exists
for two players.
Proof. There are two orderings of the players leading to two different divisions.
One division gives a utility of m and the other of U −m. At least one division
leads therefore to a utility of at least U/2, giving a proportional and envy-free
division.
Where is the cutting point? The players have to securely evaluate the following
equation for α ∈ ]i− 1, i] :
u1 + ...+ ui−1 + (αi − (i− 1))ui = (i− αi)vi + vi+1 + ...+ vN (5.1)
Equation 5.1 checks whether α ∈ ]i − 1, i] with i ∈ Z and 1 ≤ i ≤ N . If
αi ∈ ]i − 1, i], it is the exact cutting point (α = αi). The solution of the
equation is given by the following equality:
αi =
−(u1 + ...+ ui−1 − (i− 1)ui) + (i vi + vi+1 + ...+ vN )
(ui + vi)
.
In concrete terms, the function the players have to evaluate securely for ]i− 1, i]
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is
Fi(u1, . . . , uN , v1, . . . , vN ) = bi a
−1
i , with
ai = ui + vi,
bi = −
i∑
m=1
um +
N∑
m=i+1
vm + i (ui + vi).
Binary search through the intervals. The function Fi(u1, . . . , uN , v1, . . . , vN )
is computed for each of the N intervals until the cutting point is found. In
the worst case, N equations must be solved. We are going to partially solve
this efficiency issue. If αi /∈ ]i− 1, i], it is not the exact cutting point but an
estimation of α. It is all the more precise that ]i − 1, i] is close to α. Thus
αi > i implies α > i and αi < i− 1 implies α < i− 1. This makes it possible
to reduce the number of iterations through a binary search algorithm. In the
worst case log2N equations are solved. Let us show that αi > i implies α > i.
Proof. Suppose that αi > i (αi = i+  with  > 0), then the following equalities
result from Equation 5.1:
u1 + ...+ ui−1 + ((i+ )− (i− 1))ui = (i− (i+ ))vi + vi+1 + ...+ vN
u1 + ...+ ui−1 + (+ 1)ui = (−)vi + vi+1 + ...+ vN
u1 + ...+ ui︸ ︷︷ ︸∫ i
0
f1(x)dx
+(ui + vi) = vi+1 + ...+ vN︸ ︷︷ ︸∫N
i
f2(x)dx
.
The last equality implies that∫ i
0
f1(x)dx <
∫ N
i
f2(x)dx,
which directly implies that α > i since
∫ α
0
f1(x) dx =
∫ N
α
f2(x) dx with f1(x) >
0 and f2(x) > 0, for all x.
With the binary search algorithm, the computation efficiency is improved by a
factor of log2N . However, contrary to the exhaustive search that enables check-
ing all intervals in parallel, the binary search requires doing the computation
sequentially.
An alternative solution to perform the binary search is to compare the sums
of utilities
∑i
k=1 uk and
∑N
k=i vk instead of evaluating Equation 5.1. In this
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case, we share the cumulative utilities u′i =
∑i
k=1 uk and v
′
i =
∑N
k=i vk at
each iteration instead of sharing all separated utilities. It means we only share
O(logN) values instead of O(N). It does not matter if we use the solution as a
subroutine (the utilities are already shared) but it is interesting otherwise.
5.2.2 Equitable Division for k Players
With three or more players, the equitability criterion is no longer sufficient to
guarantee an envy-free or even proportional cutting. Indeed, it is not always
possible to get such a division by letting the players simply exchange their
respective share. Further, the more the number of players increases, the more
difficult it is to solve a system for each combination of all cutting points in all
intervals. As illustrated in Figure 5.2, there are k−1 cutting points (α, β, γ, . . .).
0
i - 1 i j - 1 j  k - 1 k q - 1 q
( 1 ) (2 ) (3 ) ( k )
N
Figure 5.2: The k − 1 cutting points.
The linear equation for two players (Equation 5.1) can be generalized by a
linear system of equations for three or more players (System 5.2). This system
expresses that the value the player P1 gives to the first part of the cake has to
be equal to the value the player P2 gives to the second part, that this value has
to be equal to the value the player P3 gives to the third part and so on. Other
systems are possible to achieve an equitable division. This choice was made to
obtain a system with a tridiagonal matrix that is easily factorized.
Where are the cutting points? The players have to securely evaluate the following
system for α ∈ ]i− 1, i], β ∈ ]j − 1, j], . . .,  ∈ ]q − 1, q]:
ui + vi −vj 0 · · · 0
−vi vj + wj −wk . . .
...
0 −wj wk + xk . . . 0
...
. . .
. . .
. . . −yq
0 · · · 0 −yp yq + zq


αi
βj
χk
...
q
 =

C1
C2
C3
...
Ck−1
 (5.2)
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with C1 = −
∑i
m=1 um +
∑j
m=i+1 vm + i (ui + vi)− j vj ,
C2 = −
∑j
m=i+1 vm +
∑k
m=j+1 wm − i vi + j (vj + wj)− k wk,
C3 = −
∑k
m=j+1 wm +
∑l
m=k+1 xm − j wj + k (wk + xk)− l wl,
...
Ck−1 = −
∑q
m=p+1 zm +
∑N
m=q+1 ym − p yp + q (yq + zq).
The system is solved for α, β, . . . ,  in each of the N intervals (with α < β <
. . . < ). In the worst case, the exhaustive search requires solving
Γk−1N =
(
N + k − 2
k − 1
)
=
(N + k − 2)!
(k − 1)!(N − 1)!
systems. It means that a system is solved for each random selection with
repetition and without order of k − 1 intervals among N .
Properties of the matrix. The matrix of System 5.2 is tridiagonal with strictly
positive elements on its main diagonal and strictly negative elements on the
secondary diagonals (individual utilities are strictly positive). Moreover, the
matrix is column diagonally dominant: (|aii| =
∑
i 6=j |aij | for 2 ≤ i ≤ k − 2
and |aii| >
∑
i 6=j |aij | for i = 1 and i = k − 1). The following properties hold:
1. If a matrix A is column diagonally dominant, A admits a LU-factorization
without pivoting.
2. If a tridiagonal matrix
A =

d1 e1
c2 d2 e2
c3 d3
. . .
. . .
. . . en−1
cn dn

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admits a LU factorization without pivoting, the two factors can be written
L =

1
c′2 1
c′3 1
. . .
. . .
c′n 1
 , U =

d′1 e1
d′2 e2
d′3
. . .
. . . en−1
d′n

with d′1 = d1 and
{
c′i = ci/d
′
i−1
d′i = di − c′iei−1
for i = 2 : n
The LU decomposition was introduced by Alan Turing in 1948 [93]. A detailed
analysis can be found in standard references [94],[95].
Using the LU decomposition, it is possible to simplify the system: the matrix A
is factorized into a lower triangular matrix (L) and an upper triangular matrix
(U). Instead of solving Ax = b, we solve Ly = b and Ux = y. Players only
solve (k− 1) linear equations to find β and then (k− 1) linear equations to find
α. This reduces the complexity of the protocol and is possible thanks to the
special form of the matrices L and U .
The matrix A of the initial system is invertible. This can be deduced from the
determinant of the matrices L and U . The determinant of L is equal to 1 and
the determinant of U is equal to d′1 · d′2 · . . . · d′n > 0. Let us show that the
determinant of U is strictly positive.
Proof. The matrix of the initial system is tridiagonal with strictly positive
elements on its main diagonal and strictly negative elements on the secondary
diagonals thus di > 0 for i = 1 : n, ci < 0 for i = 2 : n and ei < 0 for
i = 1 : n− 1.
d′1 = d1 > 0 (5.3)
d′i =
did
′
i−1 − ciei−1
d′i−1
(5.4)
Equation 5.4 shows that if d′i−1 > 0, then d
′
i > 0. By recurrence, we have d
′
i > 0
for i = 1 : n and thus d′1 · d′2 · . . . · d′n > 0.
The determinants of L and U are both strictly positive, which directly implies
that the determinant of A is strictly positive, that the matrix is invertible and
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finally that the system has a unique solution.
5.2.3 Practical Application
In this section we give an example for which the used definition of cake-cutting
makes sense. Suppose the case of two doctors who have to share a day on duty.
Each of them gives his preferences for each hour (let us say between 6 am and
9 pm). Since this situation is likely to be repeated, they wish to keep their
preferences private.
As each doctor wants to work as little as possible, this situation is actually
the inverse of the classical cake-cutting problem. Each doctor distributes a
total utility of 100 over the 15 intervals (hours) and gives a small utility for an
interval he is interested in and a large utility for one he is not interested in. At
the end each doctor takes the shift with the smallest utility. The work shift has
to be continuous. In Section 5.3.3, we give some efficiency results.
6 am 7 am 8 am 9 am 10 am 11 am 12 am
Doctor 1 15 7 4 1 1 1 15
Doctor 2 20 10 10 7 7 4 4
1 pm 2 pm 3 pm 4 pm 5 pm 6 pm 7 pm 8 pm
Doctor 1 4 4 4 7 7 10 10 10
Doctor 2 4 1 1 4 7 7 7 7
Table 5.2: Preferences of the doctors.
5.3 Secure Equitable Cake-Cutting
This section presents the secure protocol for an equitable cake-cutting between
two parties and gives implementation results. As described in Section 2.5, we
build our protocol on top of the arithmetic black-box functionality FABB of
Damg˚ard and Nielsen [51] extended by Toft [52]. Let q be a prime and let l ∈ Z
be a complexity parameter with l := dlog2 qe. The notation [x]q represents a
share of x over Zq and the notation [um]q stands for [u1]q, . . . , [uN ]q.
Our protocol requires a third partly-trusted player. He is not a mediator in the
strict sense because he does not know the sensible data: the utilities um and
vm. He gets only shares of these values. So, the two players need to rely less
extensively on his integrity. The third partly-trusted player has to follow the
protocol like any other player.
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The two building blocks of the cake-cutting protocol are the bit decomposition
and the approximate inversion protocols. The bit decomposition protocol is
the key tool to securely compare two shared secrets [57]. It computes the
bit-decomposition a0, . . . , al−1 ∈ {0, 1} of a =
∑l−1
i=0 ai2
i with a ∈ Fq. The total
complexity is 114 rounds and 110l log2 l+ 118l invocations of the multiplication
protocol.
The approximate inversion protocol distributively computes a floating point
approximation of 1/p using the Newton iteration [86]. Inputs are polynomial
shares of p and outputs are polynomial shares of an integer p˜ so that p˜/2t+l =
1/p + , where 0 < p˜ < 2t+2 and || < (k + 1)2−l−t+4. To have the r most
significant bits of 1/p and p˜/2t+l equal, the parameter t must be chosen bigger
than r+ 5 + log2(k+ 1). The total complexity is O(log2 t) rounds and O(log2 t)
invocations of the multiplication protocol.
5.3.1 Protocol for 2 Players
We present a secure protocol to compute an equitable division for two players
that relies on the procedure described in Section 5.2.1. The equitable cutting
point is computed in 2 steps. First, Protocol 5 determines the interval in which
the cutting point is included. Then, Protocol 7 computes the exact value of the
cutting point. We detail the protocols hereunder.
Protocol 6 securely computes the coefficients ai = ui+vi and bi = −
∑i
m=1 um+∑N
m=i+1 vm + i (ui + vi) for the interval ]i − 1, i]. It does not require any
communication between the players since um and vm are polynomial shared for
all m. Multiplication mod q of a shared element and a known element of Zq
(locmul) is achieved by having all parties locally multiply (mod q) the known
element by their shares.
Protocol 5 determines the interval in which the cutting point is included. It
is recursively called up to log2(N) times. To check if the cutting point is in
the interval ]i− 1, i], we test whether bi ∈](i− 1)ai, iai]. It is equivalent to test
whether bi/ai ∈]i − 1, i] and does not require a secure division. Lines 3 to 9
perform a secure comparison of the shared coefficient bi with the bound of the
interval multiplied by ai. Protocols from Damg˚ard et al. enable unconditionally
secure constant round multi-party computation for comparison [57]. The com-
parison function is <?: Zq ×Zq → Zq, where (x <? y) ∈ {0, 1} and (x <? y) = 1
iff x < y.
The complexities of the protocols bit-lt and bits are respectively 19 rounds
and 22l invocations of the multiplication protocol and 114 rounds and 110l log2 l+
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118l invocations of the multiplication protocol [57]. Protocol 5 uses 3 invocations
of bits and 2 invocations of bit-lt giving a total complexity of 133 rounds
and 330l log2 l + 398l invocations of mul.
Let us consider the case of 2 players and a third partly-trusted player (k=3)
with a utility function of N=10 steps of length `x = 4, where we only want to
find the correct interval, that is, we do not use the cutting-point protocol.
In the worst case, the protocol interval is called dlog2Ne = 4 times giving a
complexity of 532 rounds and 16928 invocations of the multiplication protocol.
Protocol 5: interval
Input: The list of secret utilities of both players [um]q, [vm]q and the
public left/right bound of the “cake” interval c/d.
Output: The approximate cutting point α˜.
1 i =
⌈
c+d
2
⌉
;
2 ([a]q, [b]q)← coefficients([um]q, [vm]q, i) ;
3 [g]q ← locmul(i− 1, [a]q) ;
4 [h]q ← locmul(i, [a]q) ;
5 [g]B ← bits([g]q) ;
6 [h]B ← bits([h]q) ;
7 [b]B ← bits([b]q) ;
8 [x]q ← bit-lt([b]B , [h]B) ;
9 [y]q ← bit-lt([g]B , [b]B) ;
10 x← reveal([x]q) ;
11 y ← reveal([y]q) ;
12 if x+ y = 2 then
13 α˜← cutting-point([a]q, [b]q) ;
14 return α˜ ;
15 end
16 if x = 1 then
17 interval([um]q, [vm]q, c, i− 1) ;
18 end
19 if y = 1 then
20 interval([um]q, [vm]q, i, d) ;
21 end
Protocol 7 computes the cutting point αi = Fi(um, vm) = bi a
−1
i . Protocols from
Algesheimer et al. enable to compute the exact value of the cutting point [86].
The protocol appinv([a]q) inverts the polynomial shared coefficient a. It is
iterated O(log2 t) times and one iteration requires 12 rounds and 2 invocations
of mul. Finally, appmul([a˜]q, [b]q) computes shares of an approximation to αi.
It requires 6 rounds and 1 invocation of mul. The protocol cutting-point only
deals with integers. The “tilde” variables approximate non integers values (see
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Protocol 6: coefficients
Input: The list of secret utilities of both players [um]q, [vm]q and the
interval i.
Output: The coefficients [a]q and [b]q.
1 [a]q ← add([ui]q, [vi]q) ;
2 [p]q ← locmul(i, [a]q) ;
3 for m← 1 to i do
4 [−um]q ← locmul(−1, [um]q) ;
5 end
6 [b]q ← add([−u1]q, ..., [−ui]q, [vi+1]q, ..., [vN ]q, [p]q) ;
7 return ([a]q, [b]q) ;
Protocol 7: cutting-point
Input: The coefficients [a]q and [b]q.
Output: The approximate cutting-point α˜.
1 [a˜]q ← appinv([a]q) ;
2 [α˜]q ← appmul([a˜]q, [b]q) ;
3 α˜← reveal([α˜]q) ;
4 return α˜ ;
Table 5.3).
Variable Approximated value
a˜ 2t+l/a
b˜ b/2r
α˜i = a˜ · b˜ αi · 2t+l−r
Table 5.3: Variables and corresponding approximated values used in Protocol 7.
Let us go back to the example of 2 players and a 10-step utility function. We
would like to compute the complexity of the cutting-point protocol. To have
the r = 4 most significant bits of 1/a and a˜/2t+l equal, the parameter t must be
chosen bigger than r + 5 + log2(k + 1). The protocol appinv is thus iterated at
least dlog27e = 3 times and its total complexity is 37 rounds and 6 invocations
of mul. The total complexity of the cutting-point protocol is 43 rounds and
7 invocations of mul. The total complexity of the protocol interval (with
the computation of the cutting point) is approximately 700 rounds and 17000
invocations of the multiplication protocol.
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5.3.2 Protocol for k Players
While there was a unique cutting point with two players, there are k! distinct
vectors of cutting points leading to a different equitable division with k players.
Indeed, the k! possible orderings of the players lead each to a different system
of equations that has a unique solution since the matrix A is always invertible
(Proof in Section 5.2.2).
The protocol to compute an equitable division for a chosen players ordering
is quite similar to the protocol for two players. Nevertheless, an equitable
division achieved through an arbitrary ordering is not necessary proportional.
In other words, the k players have no guarantee to receive at least 1/k of the
cake according to their valuation. Securely computing the most efficient division
among all equitable divisions for k players would then require to compare the
outcome of the k! divisions resulting from the players’ permutations.
5.3.3 Implementation Results
The protocol for two players is implemented thanks to the Virtual Ideal Func-
tionality Framework (VIFF). While VIFF can be used for applications in the
passive as well as in the active model, we only implemented our protocol with
security against a passive adversary.
Let us go back to the application of two doctors on duty who wish to determine
their respective shift (Section 5.2.3). A straightforward implementation runs in
about 20 seconds (with 7 seconds dedicated to the division needed for computing
the final cutting point). The result is α = 6.684, which means that the two
shifts are respectively from 6 am to 12:40 am and from 12:40 am to 9 pm. The
first doctor has a utility of 39,3 for the first shift and a utility of 60,7 for the
second one and vice-versa for the other doctor, so the first doctor will take the
morning shift while the second one will take the afternoon shift.
We tested the efficiency of our protocol for different numbers of intervals. The
following table shows the time taken according to the number of intervals.
Number of intervals 5 10 15 20
Execution times (sec) 13 16 19 22
Table 5.4: Execution times in function of the number of intervals.
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5.4 Conclusion
This chapter presents an equitable cake allocation procedure suitable for the
existing MPC techniques. This procedure is translated into a secure protocol
that relies on existing MPC techniques.
The cake-cutting problem is modelled to allow the use of MPC protocols. We
model the players’ preferences by step functions. This class of functions is quite
appropriate to MPC. Furthermore, a lot of functions can be approximated by
step functions. Adapting the size of the cake to the number of steps of the
function makes it possible to deal with integer values as long as possible.
The cake allocation procedure gives an equitable division with uncut pieces for
two and k players. Step functions allow finding an equitable division by only
solving linear systems. For two players, there is only one envy-free and equitable
division. It is found by solving log2N linear equations. This complexity is
obtained through a binary search algorithm. The secure MPC protocol consists
of two different stages for two players. First, a solution is found in a given
interval. Then, this solution is compared to the bounds of the interval to
determine if it solves the cake-cutting problem. There are k! possible equitable
allocations for a division between k players. Each equitable division is obtained
by solving Γk−1N linear systems.
The equitability criterion implies dealing with non integer cutting points in
the secure protocol. This is not convenient because it is not easy to solve a
system with non integer solutions thanks to MPC. An almost equitable division
in which only integer cutting points are allowed seems to be a good alternative.
It could be all the more interesting with large step functions.
It is interesting to notice that, in this case, the best way to achieve a secure
protocol is to design a completely new procedure. This highlights a completely
different behaviour compared to the sorting network approach, for example. If we
compare our oblivious protocol with its hypothetical non-oblivious counterpart,
there is no overhead in term of asymptotic complexity. However, oblivious
operations like comparisons are still more costly than non-oblivious one.
The cutting points of an equitable division reveal a precise information about
the players’ preferences. Equitability requires that all the players receive exactly
the same proportion of the cake according to their own valuation. An envy-free
division does not reveal such an exact information. Envy-freeness means that
any player prefers his own share to all the other ones. It could be interesting
to explore this criterion, which has not been developed here. An interesting
perspective would be to use Su’s algorithm which relies on a combinatorial
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result known as Sperner’s lemma [96]. This infinite algorithm constructs an
envy-free division by successive approximations [97].
There are two directions to bridge cryptography and game theory. We developed
only one direction: designing a new cake allocation procedure to solve the game-
theoretic problem of fair division under the cryptographic settings. The other
direction is to apply game theory to cryptography. In the game-theoretic
settings, all players are supposed to be rational, that is, acting in their own and
best interest. In this case, Shamir scheme is no longer relevant. An interesting
perspective would be to use the concept of rational secret sharing [98], [99] and
rational protocol design [100], [101].
Chapter 6
Securely Solving Simple
Combinatorial Graph
Problems
Graphs are one of the first objects of study in discrete mathematics. A graph
consists of vertices (also called nodes) and of edges. The edges are the connec-
tions between the vertices. An edge may be oriented and may also have a cost.
Modelling road maps is easy thanks to graphs. A city becomes a vertex and a
road an edge. The length of the road is the cost associated to an edge. Besides
road maps, graphs may be used to represent things as various as networks of
communication, computational devices, social networks, molecules or migration
paths.
Well-known graph algorithms exist to compute various problems. For example,
the minimum spanning tree (the cheapest sub-graph where each pair of vertices
is connected by exactly one simple path), the point-to-point shortest path (the
shortest path between two vertices) or the maximum flow between two vertices.
The goal of this chapter is to present a way to solve simple combinatorial graph
problems in a secure multi-party setting. Our protocols can be used as such or
as building blocks for more complex secure applications. The protocols rely on
previous work on MPC and on traditional graph algorithms.
Section 6.1 describes our contributions, related works as well as our modelling
and implementation choices: the graph representations and the minimal bounds
(on the size of Zm for example). Section 6.2 describes our approach to the
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classical single-source shortest path problem. Section 6.3 describes our approach
to the maximum flow problem. Finally, Section 6.4 raises some open problems.
6.1 Preliminaries
One common point of the applications developed in Section 2.4.1 is that the
function evaluation process is naturally oblivious of the inputs on which the
function has to be evaluated. Computing the highest of n bids or summing
n votes is carried out by performing n comparisons or sums independently of
the values that are considered. There are large classes of problems however
for which the natural evaluation process depends on the input data. In that
case, even if all the manipulated data are appropriately shared or encrypted,
the execution flow might just be sufficient to leak undesirable information.
This is typically the case in combinatorial problems, of which graph problems
are one of the most common examples. Consider, for instance, a consortium of
delivery companies covering different territories through regular distribution
circuits. These companies might be interested in computing the fastest way
to bring a package from one place to another, but be reluctant to share with
each other the precise connections they use and the performance of their trucks.
Their problem could be solved by securely evaluating traditional shortest path
algorithms such as those of Bellman-Ford or Dijkstra.
The immediate way of securely computing the shortest path would be to
blind (encrypt or share) the weight of all the edges of the corresponding
graph. However, this approach could completely miss its purpose depending
on the graph encoding and shortest path algorithm that are used: if the
algorithm conditionally visits the graph by branching as a function of the secret
weights, then the branching patterns could leak a substantial amount of secret
information. In a similar way, the resolution of combinatorial problems, even
on obfuscated inputs, can leak substantial information through the structure of
the combinatorial object that is manipulated, as well as through its running
time. We stress that this is not just a theoretical concern: numerous techniques
have been developed, notably in the line of work on side-channel attacks [102],
that can successfully exploit branching patterns and running times in order to
recover the secrets on which computation is performed.
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6.1.1 Our Contributions
This chapter investigates the problem of securely solving combinatorial problems
in a multi-party setting through series of examples taken from graph theory.
To the best of our knowledge, it was the first time that these most classical
algorithmic problems had been addressed in a general secure multi-party setting.
Our solutions have applications in the numerous contexts where a graph is
shared between competing entities. Natural examples include:
- Secure GPS guidance in which one party knows the map while the other
knows his origin and destination.
- Secure determination of topological features in social network (the number
of different ways to connect two people can be seen as a special case of
the maximum flow problem, for instance, in which case each party would
know his own friends but no more).
- Secure determination of the performance of the cooperation between
competing network operators (gas, electricity, logistics, . . . ), in which each
party would know the capacity of his own infrastructure but no more.
Furthermore, our study raises several intriguing complexity gaps and suggests the
exploration of various trade-offs. Parts of this work were written in collaboration
with A. Aly, E. Cuvelier, O. Pereira and M. Van Vyve and presented at Financial
Cryptography 2013 [2].
Algorithm Design. We focus our research on computing the shortest path and
the maximum flow based on the secure arithmetic black-box functionality of
Damg˚ard and Nielsen [51] augmented with comparison [52]. That is, our proto-
cols assume access to a functionality that offers secure addition, multiplication
and comparison. This allows us to abstract from the specific security model
in which we want our protocol to be secure: depending on the implementation
of the secure arithmetic black-box that is used, our protocols will be secure
only in the presence of an honest majority or with up to all but one corrupted
player, in the information theoretic or computational model, in front of passive
or active adversaries, . . . As described in Section 2.4.2, various such imple-
mentations, in various models, are available in tools designed for multi-party
computation such as FairplayMP [42], Sharemind [43], Sepia [45] or VIFF [48].
The implementation of our prototypes is realized thanks to this last framework.
We focus on two of the most standard graph problems, chosen for their wide
diversity of applications: computing shortest paths and maximum flows. For
each of these problems, we discuss secure evaluation techniques inspired from
classical algorithms of various complexities: Bellman-Ford and Dijkstra for the
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shortest path, and Edmonds-Karp and Push-Relabel for the maximum flow.
Our resulting algorithms offer quite different overheads, depending on the
algorithm and the graph structure, as illustrated in Table 6.1. For those
algorithms, the table shows first the traditional (non secure) complexity, then
the complexity of our secure versions expressed in number of calls to the
arithmetic functionality. There, we consider the case of a graph with public
structure and then with private structure, meaning that not only the weight
of each edge is kept secret, but that the adjacency relation between vertices is
kept private as well.
Several observations can already be made.
- The best implementations, using advanced data structures as dynamic
trees [103] or Fibonacci heaps [104], are definitely non-trivial to replicate
in the secure setting (see also discussion in Section 6.1.2 below). Their
relevance is also unclear for the relatively small size of the problems that
we are addressing, as they usually come with large constants.
- The overheads resulting from moving from the original algorithms to their
secure versions largely differ between algorithms: in the case of a public
structure for instance, we see either no difference, or an |E| factor or a
|V | factor depending on the algorithm.
- The overhead resulting from hiding the graph structure largely differs
depending on the algorithm and type of graph. For Bellman-Ford and
Push-Relabel, the difference essentially corresponds to always handling
a complete graph when the structure needs to be hidden. For Dijkstra
however, the secrecy of the graph structure has no impact.
- While Bellman-Ford is traditionally less efficient than Dijkstra, this is
no longer true (asymptotically at least) for our secure variants: Bellman-
Ford becomes substantially more efficient for sparse graphs (e.g., if |E| =
O(|V |)) and the asymptotic complexities are similar for dense graphs.
The overheads in terms of number of protocol participants, round complexity, . . .
largely depend on the implementation of the secure arithmetic functionality,
and are in line with traditional works.
Complexity: The Constants Matter. In order to challenge our algorithms
in practice, we implemented them all using the Virtual Ideal Functionality
Framework (VIFF) of Geisler et al. [48], in the honest-but-curious model.
This allowed us to further investigate the constants hidden by the asymptotic
notations discussed above. This made particularly visible the difference of cost
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Optimized Original
Public
Structure
Secret
Structure
Bellman-
Ford
|V ||E| |V ||E| |V ||E| |V |3
Dijkstra |E|+ |V | log |V | |V |2 |V |3 |V |3
Edmonds-
Karp
|V |2|E| |V ||E|2 |V ||E|2 |V |5
Push-
Relabel
|V ||E| log( |V |2|E| ) |V |3 |V |2|E| |V |4
Table 6.1: Asymptotic complexities: original algorithms and secure versions
with public and private graph adjacency matrix.
between the different black-box primitives that we used: addition based on linear
secret sharing [14] comes for free (no communication involved), multiplication is
noticeable (it involves one secret sharing), and comparison (based on Toft’s pro-
tocol [105],[81]) is ≈ 165 times more expensive than a multiplication, something
that strongly contrasts with the execution time of traditional algorithms.
These differences have strong practical impact and motivated some trade-offs
as well.
- Our version of Dijkstra’s algorithm only involves |V |2 comparisons com-
pared to |V |3 (or |V ||E|) in Bellman-Ford. As a result of this, for dense
graphs or when the graph structure is secret, Dijkstra’s algorithm remains
considerably more efficient than Bellman-Ford’s, even when the structure
of the graph is public, provided that the graphs have a reasonably small
size (a hundred vertices).
- For sparse public graphs that contain a small number of paths from the
source to the sink, a variant of the Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm that relies
on an exhaustive public enumeration of the source to sink paths can
be considerably simpler and more efficient than a secure version of the
breadth-first search for augmenting paths that is performed in the original
algorithm: this allows trading expensive book-keeping and addressing
operations for more but much simpler rounds.
So, besides the fact that our work offers the first solutions for the secure
evaluation of various graph properties, we think that it raises several intriguing
complexity issues. Notably, we wonder whether the complexity gaps that we
have are inherent to the added security or if they can be improved.
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6.1.2 Related Works
Graph Theory. An important literature on finding the shortest path in a
graph exists. Dijkstra’s algorithm computes the shortest path tree in a graph
with positive weights [106]. Sedgewick and Vitter present an algorithm to
compute the shortest path in a euclidean graph [107] while Fredman and Tarjan
propose an improvement based on Fibonacci heaps [104]. To the best of our
knowledge, there was no known result about MPC applied to graph theory in
2013. Nevertheless, Attalah and Du mention the shortest path problem as an
open problem for secure multi-party computation [108].
As mentioned above, the large majority of works on secure multi-party compu-
tation focused on functions whose evaluation execution flow is independent of
the secret inputs. There are important exceptions to this, however.
Branching Programs. Branching programs are decision procedures that, based
on some inputs and decision parameters, such as thresholds, perform a specific
classification of the input. Secure versions of these programs, where a user does
not learn the branching program of the server while the server does not learn
the user’s inputs, have been considered in various works [109], [110], [111], [28],
[112]. While these works share our goals of hiding the data path through which
the program is going, they do not aim at hiding the length of that path which,
in our case at least, could leak a substantial amount of information.
Shortest Path In The Two-Party Setting. Brickell and Shmatikov addressed the
problem of securely solving some graph problems and their work is, as such, the
closest to ours [113]. Substantial differences appear, though.
First, their security model is quite different from ours. Their protocols, which
are based on a secure set union protocol, proceed by progressively making
their outputs known to the participants as part of the execution (e.g., edge by
edge as the protocol runs). Even though this is not revealing more than the
eventual outcome, this makes their protocols unusable as sub-components of
other higher-level protocols that would rely on using these outputs as part of
their secret state. Revealing outputs part-by-part as the protocol runs might
also be problematic in applications in which some participants could abort
the protocol in the middle of its execution, based on what they have already
learned. Our protocols, on the other hand, can be freely used as subroutines, and
one of our secure max-flow algorithms will make use of a secure shortest-path
algorithm.
Second, the graph problems they consider are different from ours as well. They
do not consider the maximum flow problem at all: their work focuses on
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computing the shortest distances, from a known source to all the vertices or for
all the vertex pairs, in a setting where all the participants assign a weight to all
the edges. We further investigate the problem of computing the shortest path
from a single source to a single destination, which cannot be done using their
set union technique as it would reveal much more information than the specific
distance we are interested in.
Eventually, their protocols are not based on generic building-blocks, like the
arithmetic black-box functionality on which we rely. Specifically, their protocols
are designed for the two-party computation setting in the honest-but-curious
model. While these specifics allow them to develop techniques that are quite
efficient in this two-party setting, it is unclear how efficient a transposition of
their approach to the multi-party setting would be.
Efficient Secure Data-structures. The problem of securely computing on data-
structures has recently been investigated by Toft [52], in the case of a secure
priority queue, which he implements using a variation of bucket heap. The
problem studied there shares similar flavours with those we address here: to
securely compute on structured data by keeping the actions independent of the
inputs. The computational overhead compared to the efficiency of the original
bucket heap is logarithmic, making it occupy an interestingly different spot in
the list of overhead examples discussed above. Detailed background on data
structures can be found in standard references including Knuth [114].
Oblivious memories. In their recent paper, Efficient, Oblivious Data Structures
for MPC [115], Keller and Scholl present, among others, an oblivious imple-
mentation of a priority queue with only poly-logarithmic overhead compared
with the classical counterpart. The oblivious priority queue is then used for an
implementation of Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm on general graphs with
secret structure. The complexity is O(|E| log5 |E|+ |V | log4 |V |), with |V | and
|E| public.
Keller and Scholl benchmarked their protocol on cycle graphs, that are graphs
where the edges form a cycle passing every vertex exactly once. Their solution
outperforms ours for these low-degree graphs, especially with graphs counting
more than 128 vertices. However, our solution is always more efficient with
complete graphs. For a 128-vertex complete graph, their proposed solution
takes about 105 seconds while their implementation of our solution only takes
about 500 seconds.
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6.1.3 Modelling and Implementation Choices
Graph Representation. Depending on the algorithm we are trying to compute
and on the part of the graph description that is part of the secret input, different
graph representation approaches will be useful.
In all cases, we will assume that the number of vertices in the graph is public
(or at least an upper bound on it). Depending on the setting, the adjacency
relationship between the vertices might be public or not. For instance, it is
natural to have it public if the graph represents the connections between places
on a map, but it might be desirable to keep it secret if the presence of edges
reveals the existence of transactions between competing companies.
A traditional structure for storing a graph consists in storing, with every vertex,
a list of its neighbours (and the weight of the corresponding edges). This
structure is quite efficient in terms of memory. However, it might be quite
problematic from a security point of view, as it discloses the degree of each
vertex. A solution would be to tolerate the leakage of an upper bound on
these degrees, but that upper bound would be close to imply the storage of a
complete graph as soon as one single vertex is of high degree. Furthermore,
even if the leakage of the degree of the vertices is tolerated, algorithms that
perform breadth-first search on vertices and branch depending on the weight of
edges could reveal a lot of information. As a result, this graph representation
can be very effective in some cases, but completely inappropriate in others, even
when the graph structure is public.
A second traditional way of representing graphs is to store their adjacency
matrix, the elements of the matrix representing the weight of the edges between
vertices. This approach has the benefit of offering a storage that is independent
of the graph structure. While running our algorithms, we will often need to
perform some operations on a specific vertex designated by a secret index. This
will typically be performed by running that operation on all vertices, including
a cancelling factor everywhere but on the vertex that needs to be treated. An
obvious way of testing whether we are working on the right vertex would be
to perform a test at each step. We actually use a more effective approach by
representing the index of vertex i by a vector [i] ∈ {[0], [1]}1×n where each entry
is [0] except for the i’th which is [1]. We can then access the weight of the
edge from vertex i to vertex j by computing the matrix product [i].[W].[j]t.
Chapter 3 explains this unary approach in details.
For a graph with n vertices, Protocol 1 (extended for matrices) allows retrieving
a secret position in the adjacency matrix in O(n2) multiplications instead of
O(n2) comparisons, which is considerably more efficient, even if it implies a
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Protocol > > m >
SSSP1 |V | ·w f(>)
SSSP2 |V | ·w |V | · f(>)
SSMF1 - |V | · f(c)
SSMF2 - max(2|V |, |V | · f(c))
SSMF3 c max(f(>+ c), |V | · f(c))
Table 6.2: Minimal bounds on > and m to avoid overflows.
considerable overhead in storage (moving from 1 secret index to n secret bits).
We note that, in all cases, this approach implies treating the graph as if it were
complete, which can be a considerable waste of resources if the graph is actually
sparse.
Bounds. The size of the ring Zm has to be chosen carefully to prevent overflows.
For each protocol presented in this chapter, we provide the bounds of m and
the value of > in Table 6.2. These bounds depend on numbers such as the
maximum weight w or the maximum capacity c allowed for the edges. These
maxima are agreed in advance by the players. Remark that > is smaller than m.
Most comparison protocols require a much larger m than the values to compare.
This dependence is taken into account via a function f .
6.2 Secure Shortest Path Problem
The single-source shortest path problem is a major problem in graph theory.
It has several immediate applications. The typical one is finding the shortest
way to connect two cities on a road map where each city is represented by a
vertex and each road between two cities by an edge. The edge weights are
the road distances between cities. In this context, a user may then want to
obtain driving directions without revealing neither his starting point nor his
destination. If multiple entities maintaining each different roads in a network
want to compute the cheapest possible path between two locations, they need
to use a secure computation of the shortest path too.
Another application is the one of two entities owning each a secret location in
a shared network and willing to compute the distance between them without
disclosing their location. We note that such a problem is worth solving even for
relatively small graphs. Consider for instance a routing network with a dozen
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hubs in different European countries and three competing logistic companies
having each their own transportation costs for a defined set of roads. As
costs typically represent sensitive information that should not be disclosed to
competitors, being able to securely solve the shortest path problem for 3 parties
and a graph with a dozen of vertices is quite helpful. Similar problems happen
for network traffic on routers where a small number of big hubs is involved.
Competing companies have to solve the shortest path to define routing schemes
without revealing sensitive information about internal network configuration.
Shortest path algorithms are also used as sub-algorithms for more advanced
problems like the maximum flow problem that we address in Section 6.3 or
the Chinese postman problem [116] [117]. This last problem consists in finding
the shortest cycle going through every edge at least once. Finding an optimal
solution is NP-hard. A traditional solution to the Chinese postman problem
makes use of a shortest path algorithm to determine which edges have to
be visited twice: it computes all the shortest paths between the odd degree
vertices [118]. This highlights again the importance of keeping our protocols
composable.
We investigate two standard algorithms for finding the single-source shortest
path in a graph with weighted edges: Dijkstra’s algorithm and Bellman-Ford’s
algorithm. The first one requires all edge weights to be positive, while the second
one only assumes there is no negative-weight cycle in the input graph. As the
non-secure version of all the algorithms that we treat is widely available [119],
[120],[62], we will only briefly outline them.
All our protocols assume that inputs are already stored in the FABB functionality
and give access to the stored outputs (that can be opened through opening
requests to FABB). This feature guarantees the composability of the protocols.
The way inputs and outputs are shared depends on the application: they might
come from a specific problem, or from the needs of a higher-level protocol using
this protocol as a sub-routine, for instance.
6.2.1 Bellman-Ford’s Algorithm
The algorithm of Bellman-Ford is particularly simple, making it a natural target
for building a secure version [121]. This algorithm proceeds by repeatedly
scanning all edges, in search of adding edges that decrease the ongoing distance
from the source to the various vertices. If a pass over the edges did not improve
the current solution, or if the edges were scanned |V | times, the algorithm
halts. An interesting feature of this algorithm is that its flow of operations only
depends on the structure of the graph but not on the weight of the edges. Its
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drawback is its time-complexity: its classical implementation runs in O(|V ||E|)
time.
Protocol 8 (the SSSP1 protocol) presents our secure shortest path protocol
based on Bellman-Ford. Note that h(e) and t(e) represent the head and tail
vertex of an edge e respectively. As discussed in Section 6.1.3, note that > is a
number agreed in advance by the players as a higher bound for some calculations
of the protocol. Finally, note that updatevector refers to Protocol 1. The
SSSP1 protocol differs from the original algorithm only in a limited number of
aspects:
- The branching corresponding to the discovery of a shorter path is handled
on Lines 8–10 through arithmetic operations as in Protocol 1.
- The early termination condition of the Bellman-Ford algorithm, which
is triggered if the inner loop happens to have no effect during one pass,
is removed as it could leak information. This does not invalidate the
correctness of the algorithm but only increases the running time.
Protocol 8: SSSP1 protocol based on Bellman-Ford’s algorithm
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices and E the set
of edges, a vector of the shared weights [W]e for each e ∈ E, and
a share of the source vertex [s] ∈ V .
Output: The list of immediate predecessors [P] and/or the list of total
distances [D].
1 for i← 1 to |V | do
2 [P](i)← [0];
3 [D](i)← [>];
4 end
5 updatevector([D], [s], [0]);
6 for i← 1 to |V | do
7 for e← 1 to |E| do
8 [y]← [D](t(e))− [D](h(e)) + [W](e);
9 [x]← [y] < 0;
10 [D](h(e))← [D](h(e)) + [x] · [y];
11 [P](h(e))← ([1]− [x]) · [P](h(e)) + [x] · t(e);
12 end
13 end
14 If there was an update during the very last pass, the solution is
unbounded (there is a negative cycle).
The structure of this algorithm makes it easy to implement with either of the
two graph representations discussed above (list or matrix). It is thus possible
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to fully exploit the sparsity of the graph when the structure is public (we use
the matrix representation if it has to be kept secret).
It can be seen that our implementation requires |V ||E| secure comparisons,
dominating the time required to perform 2|V ||E| secure multiplications and
5|V ||E| additions. These complexities grow to O(|V |3) when the graph structure
is secret, as the graph is then treated as complete (i.e., augmented with edges
of infinite weight). Very interestingly, this algorithm is the only one among
those we treated in which our solution does not raise any asymptotic overhead
(when the structure is public).
Security. The simulation of an execution of this protocol is immediate from
the simulators available for the different calls that can be made by the FABB
functionality: the simulators corresponding to each of the ‘+’, ‘·’ and ‘<’
operations can be invoked in turn, in an order defined by the protocol execution,
and a number of times that only depends on public values (|V | and |E|).
Proposition 3. The protocol is secure if a player is not able to distinguish an
execution of the protocol in the real world (where he is exchanging information
with the other players) from an execution in the ideal world (where he is
exchanging information with a trusted party via a simulator).
Proof. The simulators of the basic operations are invoked in a predefined order
that does not change from one execution to the other. For example, in Protocol 8,
there are |V | · |E| calls to the sequence: 2 ‘+’, 1 ‘<’, 1 ‘·’, 2 ‘+’, 2 ‘·’ and 1 ‘+’.
This sequence is constant and is always applied on the same shares. The number
of calls to the sequence only depends on the number of edges and vertices in
the graph.
The same argument will apply to the other protocols we present in this chapter,
and we will therefore not come back to it.
6.2.2 Dijkstra’s Algorithm
Dijkstra’s algorithm computes the shortest path from the source to all vertices
in the graph, that is, the shortest path tree rooted at the source. The algorithm
is greedy. At each iteration one vertex (the one with the smallest distance label)
is permanently updated to the status scanned. This feature may be exploited
to reduce the number of iterations if we are only interested in the shortest path
from the source to a given target and not in a complete shortest path tree. The
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computations can be stopped once the target vertex has been scanned, even
though this may leak information about the weights.
Adapting Dijkstra. The fact that Dijkstra’s algorithm goes through the graph
in an order that depends on the weight of the edges makes it very difficult
to efficiently exploit the sparsity of a graph: our best solutions have all a
complexity that amounts to the one of a complete graph, and we therefore use
the matrix representation in all cases for our protocol.
Protocol 9: SSSP2 protocol based on Dijkstra’s algorithm.
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the set of vertices and E the set
of edges, a matrix of shared weights [W]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}
and a source vertex [s] ∈ V (given in unary representation).
Output: The vector of distances [D]i for i ∈ {1, ..., |V |} and the matrix
of predecessor [P]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}.
1 for i← 1 to |V | do
2 [D](i)← [>];
3 [Q](i)← [0];
4 for j ← 1 to |V | do
5 [P](i, j)← [0];
6 end
7 end
8 updatevector([D], [s], [0]);
9 for i← 1 to |V | do
10 [D’]← [D] + [Q];
11 [min], [k]← binarymin([D’]);
12 updatevector([Q], [k], [>]);
13 for j ← 1 to |V | do
14 [a]← ([D] + [W](∗, j)) · [k];
15 [c]← [a] < [D](j);
16 [P]← updaterow([P], j, [P](j) + [c] · ([k]− [P](j)));
17 [D](j)← [D](j) + [c] · ([a]− [D](j));
18 end
19 end
20 return [D], [P];
Protocol 9 (the SSSP2 protocol) presents our secure shortest path protocol
based on Dijkstra’s algorithm. Note that updatevector refers to Protocol 1
and that updaterow is the natural extension of updatevector for replacing a
complete row in a shared matrix. Protocol binarymin (Protocol 3) has been
introduced by Toft to obtain the minimal value out of a vector of shared values.
It securely computes a share of the minimal value, [min], along with a share
of its index, [k]. The protocol uses O(n) comparisons and multiplications. Its
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overall round complexity is O(log(n)) rounds. Vector Q records the status of
each vertex. An entry is equal to zero if the corresponding vertex has not been
scanned yet. It is updated to > as soon as the vertex has been scanned.
The main differences between the traditional and our secure version of Dijkstra’s
algorithm happen in the inner loop:
- On Line 9, the loop goes through all vertices instead of only considering
the neighbours of the current vertex. In particular, this includes an
always transparent step where we consider the current vertex and gives a
substantial overhead if a public sparse graph is considered.
- On Lines 4 – 8 – 12, we need to go through all elements of a row or a
vector, even if we know that only one of them is going to be updated.
Those two modifications contribute to the same effect: they increase the original
complexity of Dijkstra from O(|V |2) to O(|V |3). More precisely, the exact
number of comparisons is 2|V |2−3|V |+1 and the exact number of dot products
(used for the multiplication of vectors, costing |V | multiplications) is 2|V |2−|V |
for |V | ≥ 4.
As the comparison protocol we use requires 165 multiplications to compute a
comparison, the number of multiplications to compute the shortest path in a
complete tree is about 2|V |3 + 329|V |2 − 495|V |+ 165.
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, the switch from quadratic to cubic dominance is at
about 165 vertices which is precisely the number of multiplications used by a
single comparison.
Our secure version of Dijkstra comes with an overhead of a factor |V | compared
to the original one, even when the graph structure can be considered as public.
We note that this was not the case in the work of Brickell [113] who considered
running Dijkstra securely as well, but accepted to output the shortest paths
step by step. Besides the limitation that this brings when the protocol has to
be composed, we also observe that our algorithm can be used to solve problems
that could not be solved by Brickell’s approach, namely, computing the shortest
path between two specific vertices without leaking any other information: their
approach indeed leaks the shortest path to all vertices.
6.2.3 Implementation Prototypes
We implemented our protocols over the Virtual Ideal Functionality Framework
to challenge their performance. We considered a 3-party execution in the
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Figure 6.1: Number of multiplications when running Algorithm 9. The dashed
lines highlight the quadratic then cubic growths.
information theoretic model with passive security: secret values are shared
using Shamir’s secret sharing, the BGW protocol is used for multiplication [5],
and Toft’s protocol is used for comparison [105]. These choices were made
for simplicity and ease of prototyping, though much more efficient protocols
exist and would have led to considerably shorter running times [53],[55]. The
computation was performed on a single workstation equipped with an Intel
Xeon CPUs X5550 (2.67GHz) and 24GB of memory, running a standard Debian
Squeeze.
We ran the two shortest path protocols described above on complete graphs
of various sizes. This first showed that Protocol 8 can only be conveniently
used for graphs where |V ||E| ≈ 103 (a few minutes on a standard laptop): see
Table 6.3.
Number of vertices 4 8 16 32 64 128
Execution times (sec)
SSSP1
9 63 501 4003 31951 -
Execution times (sec)
SSSP2
9 13 50 217 1018 5622
Table 6.3: Execution times of Protocols 8 and 9 for a complete shortest path
tree.
Our secure versions of Bellman-Ford and Dijkstra have approximately the same
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complexity for complete graphs. However the quadratic number of comparisons
makes it possible to run our secure version of Dijkstra on a 64-vertex complete
graph in roughly twice the time as taken by Bellman-Ford on a 16-vertex graph,
and we have been able to run it up to a 128-vertex complete graph (i.e., counting
16256 directed edges) in a bit more than an hour.
While these timings might look fairly high, they still make it possible to solve
natural problems in a reasonable time. The 3-party, 12-vertex problem outlined
above could be solved in about 30 seconds, for instance.
6.2.4 Comments on Memory Usage
During our prototyping phase of Dijkstra’s algorithm, we studied three different
settings that differ with regards to the data considered as private. It results in
a difference in terms of time and memory efficiency. All implementations use a
matrix for the graph representation.
In the first implementation (the one described in Protocol 9), the graph and the
source are shared. Dijkstra’s algorithm is performed completely and outputs a
vector with the shortest tree path from the source to all the other vertices. The
execution time does not leak any information. The implementation does not
use any synchronization point and is feasible up to 128 vertices.
The last two implementations only compute the shortest path from a source
to a target. A synchronization point is introduced after each main iteration
(there are at most n synchronization points). These points slightly slow down
the execution but reduce the memory usage (see Figures 6.2 and 6.3). The
algorithms stop as soon as the target is scanned. In one implementation, both
the source and the target are known. The algorithm outputs one of the shortest
path along with its distance. In the other implementation, the source and
the target are shared between players. They only learn the shortest distance
between these two vertices. This approach may be useful as a subroutine for
other algorithms. For example, the Chinese postman problem makes use of
Dijkstra’s shortest path to determine which edges have to be visited twice. It
computes all the shortest paths between the odd degree vertices. If we wish
to keep the degree of vertices secret, we may use such an implementation of
Dijkstra. These last two implementations are feasible for a complete graph up
to 256 vertices.
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Figure 6.2: Time and memory usage (with the python memory-track argument)
for the computation of the shortest path tree.
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--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command:            python dijkstra-shared-index.py --no-ssl player-1.ini
Massif arguments:   (none)
ms_print arguments: massif.out.24790
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MB
74.18^  #                                                                     
     |  #:::::::::                                                            
     |  #:::::: ::::::::::                                                    
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::::                                           
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@:::::                                  
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:                          
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@                 
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::        
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     |  #:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
     | @#:::::: ::::: : :::::::::: :::@: :::::::::@:::::::::@:::::@:::::@:::::
   0 +----------------------------------------------------------------------->Gi
     0                                                                   94.54
Number of snapshots: 84
Detailed snapshots: [1, 3 (peak), 30, 42, 54, 64, 74]
(a) without any synchronization
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Command:            python dijkstra-shared-index-sync.py --no-ssl player-1.ini
Massif arguments:   (none)
ms_print arguments: massif.out.24919
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    MB
28.40^                                                                    #   
     |                                                               @@   #:: 
     |                                      ::   :   @    :   @: @:: @@:::#:::
     |                          :       ::: : :: ::::@::::::::@::@:::@@:::#:::
     |             ::   :   :::::::  ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | ::: @@:  :::: @:::@@:::: :::::::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ ::::: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
     | :: :@ :: :: : @: :@ :::: :::: ::::: :: :::::::@::: :: :@::@:::@@:::#:::
   0 +----------------------------------------------------------------------->Gi
     0                                                                   133.8
Number of snapshots: 66
Detailed snapshots: [4, 10, 13, 36, 43, 46, 51, 52, 58, 59, 60 (peak)]
(b) with synchronization points
Figure 6.3: Memory usage (with valgrind) for the complete shortest path in a
16-vertex graph.
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6.2.5 Leakage by Execution Flow: an Illustration
In this section, we show how the execution flow can reveal sensitive information
even with a secure algorithm. We will run a standard Dijkstra’s algorithm on
the graph in Figure 6.4. It is an 8-vertex sparse graph. We want to compute
the shortest-path tree rooted at vertex 0 and keep the source secret as well as
the cost of the edges.
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Figure 6.4: An 8-vertex graph.
Figure 6.5 shows the two first iterations of Dijkstra’s classical algorithm. Once
scanned the vertices are depicted in grey. During the first iteration, 4 neighbour
vertices are explored and labelled (vertices 1, 4, 6 and 7). As we can see on
Figure 6.4, vertex 0 is the only vertex to have 4 neighbours. It means that even
with a source shared between the players, the execution flow reveals the source
to all parties. The same issue can be observed on the second iteration. Vertex
7 is the only vertex that has 3 neighbours.
In the case of shortest path, the execution flow reveals at worst the order in
which the vertices are scanned. This information does not reveal the actual
distances but reveals, for example, that vertex 7 is the closest to the source.
Depending on the application, this information leakage could remove the interest
of dealing with secret-shared information. This is why we use a complete graph.
6.2.6 Secure Shortest Path with a Priority Queue
In this section, we use Toft’s priority queue [52] in the secure shortest path
based on Dijkstra’s algorithm proposed in Section 6.2.2 (Protocol 9). Toft’s
priority queue is based on MPC primitives and contrary to ORAM implemen-
tations (e.g. Keller and Scholl [115]), it is deterministic. Toft’s priority queue
offers two operations: PQ-insert(p, x) which inserts a shared variable x with
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(a) First iteration
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(b) Second iteration
Figure 6.5: The two first itration of Dijkstra’s classical algorithm.
shared priority p in an initially empty list and PQ-getmin() which returns and
removes from the list the pair (p, x) with the lowest priority p. The complexity
of these two operations is O(log2(n)) amortized (with n the overall number
of operations performed). However, the priority queue does not support the
decrease-key(p′, x) operation which is of central interest for Dijkstra’s algo-
rithm. The role of decrease-key is to update (here decrease) the priority p of
a variable x in the priority queue.
To avoid the decrease-key operation, Chen et al. proposed, broadly speaking,
to replace it by a PQ-insert operation [122]. It implies outdated values in the
priority queue: the same vertex may appear at multiple places with different
priorities. The lowest priority is the updated one. After each PQ-getmin
operation, it is necessary to test the status of the vertex to know if it is worth
exploring or not (an outdated vertex will not improve any distance). Chen et al.
do not consider the case of secure graphs but in the “clear” world, they claim
that this kind of priority queue implementations make Dijkstra’s algorithm
even more efficient in practice. Indeed, Dijkstra’s algorithm requires more
PQ-insert and PQ-getmin operations than it would require from a priority
queue supporting the decrease-key operation but the complexity of these
PQ-insert and PQ-getmin operations is less. To support the decrease-key
operation, priority queues use mechanisms that increase the complexity of the
PQ-insert and PQ-getmin operations.
Algorithm. As usual, we have a graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices
and E the list of edges, a matrix of shared weights [W], a vector of the distances
from the source [D] and a source vertex [s]. The source vertex is given in a
unary notation. The shared identity matrix [U] of size |V | is used to insert
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vertices represented as indices in a unary notation.
An element in the priority queue may have three different status. First, an
element can be up-to-date, that is the only element that would appear in a
priority queue with a decrease-key operation. Second, an up-to-date element
(p, x) can become outdated if we perform a PQ-insert(p′, x) operation. The
vertex x has now a weaker priority p′ and the element (p, x) becomes outdated.
Finally, some elements are fake (with priority >) and remain fake during the
whole execution. To simplify the presentation we follow Keller and Scholl and
do not track the status of the predecessor vector.
Protocol 10: SSSP3 protocol based on Dijkstra’s algorithm with Toft’s
priority queue.
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices and E the list
of edges, a matrix of shared weights [W]i,j for i, j ∈ {1, ..., |V |}, a
shared identity matrix [U]i,j and a source vertex [s] ∈ V .
Output: The vector of distances [D]i for i ∈ {1, ..., |V |}.
1 for i← 1 to |V | do
2 [D](i)← [>];
3 end
4 updatevector([D], [s], [0]);
5 PQinsert([0], [s]);
6 for j ← 1 to |V | · (|V | − 1)/2 + 1 do
7 [p], [x]← PQgetmin();
8 for i← 1 to |V | do
9 [a]← ([D] + [W](∗, i)) · [x];
10 [c]← [a] < [D](i);
11 [D](i)← [D](i) + [c] · ([a]− [D](i));
12 PQinsert([c] · [D](i) + (1− [c]) · [>], [U](∗, i));
13 end
14 end
15 return [D];
Analysis. The main loop of Protocol 10 is iterated |V | · (|V | − 1)/2 + 1 times. It
corresponds to the worst case scenario, where each remaining vertex is updated
at each iteration with a lower priority. This means that we do not need to
reveal the total number of updates performed on vertices during the algorithm.
Moreover, we do not reveal neither which vertices have been updated, nor how
many times they have been updated, nor when they have been updated. At no
time in the execution, we reveal if the secret vertex we are treating is outdated
or not. Thus, we do not stop the execution when coming across an outdated
vertex. It avoids leaking potential information but increases the complexity.
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This change does not compromise the correctness because an outdated vertex
will not be able to improve any distance. We use also fake PQ-insert operations
to standardize the execution flow.
The algorithm performs O(|V |2) PQ-getmin operations and O(|V |3) PQ-insert
operations. The overall complexity is O(|V |3) invocations of the comparison
protocol and O(|V |4) invocations of the multiplication protocol. In conclusion, it
seems difficult to use efficiently Toft’s priority queue in our secure setting. If we
do not allow any information leakage, our algorithm has a tremendous overhead
and is outperformed by our more basic implementation in Section 6.2.2.
6.3 Secure Maximum Flow
In an oriented graph where the edges have a constraint of capacity, the maximum
flow problem consists in finding the maximum number of units that can be
carried from a vertex called source to another vertex called sink. The flow
through an edge designates the number of units passing by it. This number
cannot exceed the capacity.
The first maximum flow algorithm was presented by Ford and Fulkerson in
1956 [123], [124]. Other solutions followed, for example, Edmonds-Karp algo-
rithm [125], [126] and the Push-Relabel algorithm of Goldberg and Tarjan [127].
The maximum flow problem has numerous classical applications. In the spirit
of our previous examples, one of them could be competing transport companies
willing to determine the capacity they could reach if they decided to make a
joint-venture. It is natural in such a context to expect that these companies
will not be willing to disclose their full network structure to each other. As in
the case of the shortest path, algorithms solving the maximum flow problem
are also very useful as subroutines for solving other problems. The minimum
cut problem is one such traditional example, which can be solved using O(|V |)
invocations of the maximum flow algorithm. Solving this problem is then useful
to determine where the weak points of the joint network would be.
In this section, we present two secure protocols for computing a maximum flow.
The first one is based on Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm and the second one is
based on the Push-Relabel algorithm.
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6.3.1 Edmonds-Karp’s Algorithm
The basic idea of Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm is to find an augmenting path in
the residual graph that is the graph in which the edges are weighted by their
residual capacity, i.e., the capacity minus the current flow. Each augmenting
path increases the total flow so that the algorithm eventually terminates when
there is no augmenting path left. The increase is monotonic and paths are
considered once only. Typically, Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm uses a breadth-first
search to find the next augmenting path.
The asymptotic complexity of the traditional algorithm is O(|V ||E|2). As we
have seen in the case of the shortest path problem, this complexity will be
prohibitive even for very small graphs if they are complete. It therefore makes
sense to focus our attention on (oriented) strongly sparse graphs, of which we
consider the structure to be public. More precisely, we consider graphs in which
the number of paths from the source to the sink is fairly small, e.g., bounded
by a small polynomial in the number of vertices.
Protocol 11: SSMF1 maximum flow protocol based on Edmonds-Karp’s
algorithm.
Input: A graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices and E the list
of edges, a source vertex so ∈ V , a sink vertex si ∈ V , and a list
p of length k containing the paths between so and si sorted in a
growing order of length. A set of capacities [C]e for e ∈ E and a
set of flows [F]e initially set to [0] for e ∈ E. Edge e¯ is the edge in
the opposite direction of edge e.
Output: The maximum flow value from so to si.
1 while |p| > 0 do
2 p← pop(p);
3 [r], [i]← binarymin([C(e)]− [F(e)] | e ∈ p);
4 [b]← [r] > 0;
5 [a]← [b] · [r];
6 for e ∈ p do
7 [F(e)]← [F(e)] + [a];
8 [F(e¯)]← [F(e¯)]− [a];
9 end
10 end
11 return
∑
e∈S
[F(e)] where S = {e ∈ E|h(e) = so};
The algorithm is given on input a list containing all the paths sorted in a
growing order of length, p = (p1, ..., pk) where k is the number of paths in
the graph. This list is not secret as the structure is not, and can therefore be
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Number of paths 2 4 8 14 37 86 135
Number of edges 22 21 25 25 32 30 30
Execution times
(sec)
3 6 9 18 40 94 148
Table 6.4: Execution times of Protocol 11 for 10-vertex graphs.
easily constructed in public. Our protocol based on Edmonds-Karp (the SSMF1
protocol) is presented in Protocol 11.
The main differences between this protocol and Edmonds-Karp’s approach are:
- Our protocol uses a public enumeration of all the paths instead of a
breadth-first search for capacity augmenting paths.
- Our protocol treats all the paths as if they were augmenting.
Protocol 11 is correct as the set of all the augmenting paths is contained in
the set of all the paths p. Moreover, it ensures the confidentiality of the edge
capacities as no information is leaked about which path of p is augmenting and
which is not.
As the length of the longest path in the graph is bounded by |V |−1, Protocol 11
requires O(k|V |) comparisons and O(k) multiplications. This protocol makes a
crucial use of the existence of a small number of paths in the graph, something
that we were not able to use in Protocol 9 for instance. It is however highly
inefficient for dense graph and would have a factorial complexity for complete
graphs.
This protocol applies well to our previous example of the three competing
logistic companies trying to determine the max flow in their joint networks. If
we consider a case with 10 vertices and 37 different paths, the execution takes
less than a minute as shown in Table 6.4.
6.3.2 Push-Relabel Algorithm
The Push-Relabel algorithm, also called relabel-to-front when implemented with
a FIFO list, introduces two additional attributes for the vertices, the height
and the excess. An edge is called admissible if it goes from a higher to a lower
vertex. The algorithm alternatively pushes the excess along admissible edges
and increases the height of the vertices until all excess has been pushed to the
sink or back to the source.
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The basic operation of the algorithm is Push/Relabel applied to a given vertex.
This operation pushes all the excess through incident admissible edges (updating
the excesses of incident vertices accordingly). Finally, in case not all the excess
has been pushed, the elevation of the vertex is minimally increased so as to
create at least one more admissible edge, and Push/Relabel terminates.
Throughout the algorithm a list L with vertices with positive excess (except
the source and the sink) is maintained. At each iteration, one vertex of L is
selected and Push/Relabel is applied. The algorithm terminates when the list
is empty. In the FIFO implementation, the next vertex of L to be treated is
selected in the FIFO order. This FIFO Push/Relabel algorithm terminates in
O(|V |3) operations.
Our protocol based on Push-Relabel is presented in Protocol 12. The main
differences between this protocol and the traditional Push/Relabel algorithm
are as follows:
- When Push/Relabel is applied to a vertex with zero excess, no update of
the elevation is performed at the end.
- In each phase, treat all vertices except the source and the sink, in a fixed
order agreed between the players.
- During each Push/Relabel operation applied to a vertex i, the order
in which the edges (i, j) are considered is fixed and agreed in advance
between the players.
These changes do not modify the correctness of the original algorithm.
Moreover, it can be verified that the relabel-to-front algorithm terminates in
maximum 4|V |2−10|V |+12 complete phases. Therefore we obtain an “all-cases”
complexity of O(|V |2|E|), both in comparisons and multiplications. Note that
this does not match the FIFO complexity, because we scan all edges at each
pass, even when the excess of the tail vertex is zero.
The complexity of this algorithm remains lower than the one of the original
Edmonds-Karp and it is asymptotically better than the optimized version
of Edmonds-Karp presented in Section 6.3.1 for graphs with vertices of high
degree. However, the running time of Protocol SSMF2 remains very high.
Experiments showed that the use of a traditional halting criterion at the end of
each SSMF2 phase (i.e. nothing has been pushed) results in dramatic running
time improvements. However it also demonstrated a huge variability (the
algorithm may halt after a single phase), which suggests that a substantial
amount of information could be derived from it. Quantifying this information
is left for future work, and its impact is likely to depend on the application.
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Protocol 12: A phase of the SSMF2 protocol based on Push/Relabel.
Input: A complete graph G = (V,E) where V is the list of vertices and
E the list of edges. A vertex i to be treated, a vector of elevations
[H], a matrix of residual capacities [R] and a vector of excesses
[Z].
Output: Update of the elevations [H], the residual capacities [R] and
the excesses [Z] for a phase.
1 [δ]← 2|V | ;
2 for j ← 1 to |E| do
3 [α]← [H(i)] > [H(j)];
4 [x]← min([Z(i)], [R(i, j)]);
5 [y]← [α] · [x];
6 [R(i, j)]← [R(i, j)]− [y];
7 [R(j, i)]← [R(j, i)] + [y];
8 [Z(i)]← [Z(i)]− [y];
9 [Z(j)]← [Z(j)] + [y];
10 [δ]← min([δ], [H(j)] + 2|V | · [α]);
11 end
12 [α]← [Z(i)] > 0;
13 [H(i)]← [H(i)] · (1− [α]) + ([δ] + 1) · [α];
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we proposed two protocols for securely computing shortest
paths as well as two protocols for securely computing maximum flows in graphs.
Besides the interest that these protocols have in the numerous contexts in which
their insecure counterparts found applications in the past (possibly relying
on a trusted third party), our investigation raised interesting complexity gaps
between centralized algorithms and secure protocols, ranging from a constant to
something growing like the number of vertices in the graphs. It is then natural
to wonder whether these gaps, when they arise, can be decreased. Various
avenues appear for that purpose:
- Design efficient data-structures adapted to the investigated problems.
In particular, whether data structures similar to dynamic trees or Fi-
bonacci heaps are implementable in a secured setting without revealing
the execution flow remains an open question.
- Investigate whether secure comparisons, which often are a bottleneck, can
be traded for other, cheaper, arithmetic operations. This raises unusual
questions from a traditional algorithmic point of view, as comparisons are
usually considered as basic operations.
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Considering other standard combinatorial problems could also provide new
insights. The protocols and results presented in the chapter are prototypes
that validate the theoretical complexity evaluations. While the running times
given for the protocols look impractical for large graphs, this issue must be
put in perspective. Indeed, an implementation for concrete applications should
definitively be improved by relying on lower level programming languages
and optimized underlying libraries. Various optimization techniques (see, e.g.,
Bendlin et al. [53] or Damg˚ard et al. [55]) would lead to performance increases of
several orders of magnitude, as has been observed in the case of the AES during
the last 3 years for instance (see, e.g. Damg˚ard et al. [54] and the references
within).

Part III
Conclusion

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Open
Problems
Secure multi-party computation has been at the centre of cryptography research
for almost 30 years. First, a series of foundational works demonstrated the
possibility to evaluate any function in various models, the function being
described as a circuit. Nowadays, research on this topic largely focuses on
building practical solutions for specific problems. A lot of work has been carried
out, for example, on benchmarking, auctions and voting applications.
One common point of these applications is that the function evaluation process
is naturally oblivious of the inputs on which the function is evaluated. However,
there are large classes of problems for which the natural evaluation process
depends on the input data. In that case, even if all manipulated data are shared,
the execution flow might leak undesirable information.
This thesis aims to address these complex problems that are not easy to represent
in a secure setting. The originality of the thesis lies in the fact that it proposes
the first secure protocols to solve some classical problems of game and graph
theory. A second value added by this thesis lies in the fact that it analyses the
various complexity gaps between the new secure algorithms and their traditional
counterparts. These issues were largely ignored in previous work.
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7.1 Contributions
Our first target was to design secure sorting algorithms. We proposed a sorting
algorithm based on the Odd-even merge sorting network. This approach leads
to an overhead by a constant factor. The asymptotic complexities are the same
as the traditional ones. Then, we presented new sorting algorithms based on a
unary representation of integers. These algorithms come with a linear overhead
compared with their theoretical non-secure counterpart. This second approach
is useful as a subroutine for an application using the same unary representation
for integers. It avoids the extra costs linked with the change of representation.
Then, we studied the game-theoretic problem of fair division. More precisely,
we studied the so-called cake-cutting problem that is the problem of dividing a
heterogeneous good among parties with different interests. We developed a new
secure procedure that does not have a game-theoretic equivalent. Indeed, we
used the fact that utilities can be kept secret while performing computations
on them. If we compare our oblivious protocol with its hypothetical non-
oblivious counterpart, there is no overhead in term of asymptotic complexity.
However, oblivious operations like comparisons are still more costly than their
non-oblivious counterparts.
Finally, we studied different graph problems. Our work offers the first solutions
for the secure evaluation of various graph properties. We compared in details
different approaches that raise interesting complexity issues. For the single
source shortest path, we compared two prototypes. The first one is based on
Bellman-Ford’s algorithm and the second one on Dijkstra’s algorithm. Bellman-
Ford is traditionally less efficient than Dijkstra. This is no longer true for the
asymptotic complexities of our secure variants. Bellman-Ford is able to exploit
the sparsity of the graph while Dijkstra always performs a shortest path on a
complete graph. For the maximum flow, we compared two approaches based on
Edmonds-Karp’s algorithm and the Push-Relabel algorithm.
Our contributions illustrate a wide range of behaviours when passing to secure
versions. There is no asymptotic overhead for sorting networks while there is
a linear overhead for unary sorting. For the fair division problem, the most
efficient way we came up with is to design a new procedure that does not have
a counterpart in game-theory. Our new secure procedure enables reaching an
equilibrium that dominates those that were previously known in unmediated
procedures. For the graph problems, we obtained various overheads depending
on the structure of the graph and on the algorithm used.
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7.2 Perspectives
Several elements deserve future work following on from this thesis:
1. In this work, we identified several complexity gaps between traditional
and secure approaches. These problems are little known in the current
literature and raise several open questions. It would be interesting to better
understand the source of these gaps and, for example, prove lower bounds
or establish classes of problems with the same overhead. Problems with a
pseudo-polynomial time algorithm seem worth of further exploration in
this respect. As seen with the knapsack problem, these problems could
allow using a unary representation without asymptotic overhead.
2. In the present work, we provide algorithms without any information
leakage. However, this approach comes with important extra costs while
leakage of some variables or elements of the structure could have no impact
for some applications. An interesting future direction would be to study
these security aspects in more details in order to precisely quantify the
information leakage and its consequences. Leaking information could lead
to real improvements in complexity. For example, when we compute a
point-to-point shortest path, we can stop the execution once we have
determined the shortest path. This would, however, reveal the number of
iterations executed, but there might be contexts or types of graphs where
this is harmless.
3. There are other classes of algorithms we could study, for example, sub-
linear algorithms. These algorithms solve problems approximately by only
exploring a small portion of them. They can be used to test whether a
graph is bipartite or has a clique of a given size. Sub-linear algorithms
estimate if the graph is far from satisfying the property or if it satisfies
it. The error rate can be reduced by executing the property test many
times. These algorithms are random and iterative which could be helpful
to perform parallel executions. They could also lead to efficient solutions
because they could easily use the technique of randomizing inputs, for
example in graph problems, by working on an isomorphism of the graph.
4. Our oblivious algorithms have deterministic execution patterns. How-
ever, oblivious memories achieve obliviousness thanks to a probabilistic
behaviour. They allow outsourcing some data on a remote server and ac-
cessing them in a way that makes it infeasible to know what specific piece
of data has been accessed. Oblivious RAM might speed up secure multi-
party computation when they involve large data. However, it comes with
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a non-negligible computational overhead, O(log2 n), in the best solutions.
Oblivious memories might even help for branching when the patterns of
the execution of the branches are all identical. Oblivious RAM or similar
oblivious data structures that can work without ORAM [52] could be a
very useful tool in specific cases, as a complement of the techniques we
use.
5. In this thesis, we used a Python library (VIFF) to prototype our algo-
rithms. This framework was ideal to benchmark different implementations.
However, the library in VIFF is quite limited. For instance, numerous al-
gorithms have been proposed to speed up the online phase of MPC thanks
to pre-computation, which is not done in VIFF. The complexity gaps
might be different if we use pre-computation and focus on the complexity
of the online computation phase only.
Appendix A
MPC Primitives
A.1 Protocols for secure comparison
In this section, we present a protocol for secure comparison introduced by
Damg˚ard et al. [57]. The bit decomposition protocol is the key tool to compare
two shared secrets securely. A protocol for secure bit decomposition was also
presented by Algesheimer et al. [86]. However, it is only passively secure and is
not a constant round protocol. This section focuses on the bit decomposition
protocol of Damg˚ard et al., which is the first constant round comparison protocol
and the basis of the protocol used in the VIFF-based implementations.
Bit decomposition: BITS([a]p)
Let p be a prime, log2 p = Θ(l). All modular arithmetic is done on Zp =
{x ∈ Z | 0 ≤ x ≤ p− 1}, p > k and p a prime number. Protocol 13 computes
the bit-decomposition a0, . . . , al−1 ∈ {0, 1} of a =
∑l−1
i=0 ai2
i with a ∈ Fp.
The first idea of the protocol for computing the bit-decomposition of a shared
value [a]p is to use the bit-decomposition of a random value [b]p. This idea is in
line with the idea used for the inversion of a shared element. The shared value
is “hidden” by a random value [c]p ← [a]p − [b]p. This new value [c]p can then
be revealed without leaking information about the shared value and used for
further computation. This is done in Lines 1 to 4 of Protocol 13.
As explained by Damg˚ard [57], c = a− b mod p and d = c+ b (in the integers).
Therefore, d = a+ pq for some q ∈ {0, 1}. Since a ∈ {0, . . . , p− 1}, it follows
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Protocol 13: [a]B ← BITS([a]p)
1 The input is [a]p, where a ∈ Fp.
2 ([b0]p, . . . , [bl−1]p, [b]p)← SOLVED-BITS().
3 [a− b]p ← [a]p − [b]p.
4 c← REVEAL([a− b]p), where c ∈ Fp.
5 [d]B ← BIT-ADD(c, [b]B), where [d]B = ([d0]p, . . . , [dl]p).
6 [q]p ← BIT-LT(p, [d]B).
7 (f0, . . . , fl−1) = BITS(2l − p), the bitwise representation of the positive
integer 2l − p.
8 For i = 0, . . . , l − 1 in parallel: [gi]p = fi[q]p.
9 [g]B = ([g0]p, . . . , [gl−1]p).
10 [h]B ← BIT-ADD([d]B , [g]B), where [h]B = ([h0]p, . . . , [hl+1]p).
11 [a]B = ([h0]p, . . . , [hl−1]p).
12 Output [a]B .
that q = 1 iff p < d. A sharing of q is computed in Line 6.
Then, the following equalities hold: f = 2l − p (Line 7), g = qf = q2l − qp in
the integers (Line 8), h = d + g = (a + qp) + (q2l − qp) = a + q2l (Line 10).
Now h is either a or a + 2l. The problem is solved by computing h mod 2l,
i.e., dropping the two most significant bits of h since [h]B = ([h0]p, . . . , [hl+1]p).
This is the key idea of this protocol.
This protocol leaks no information as long as all sub-protocols are private.
The value c, revealed in Line 4, is uniformly random in Fp and leaks thus no
information about a. The total complexity is 114 rounds and 110l log2 l + 118l
invocations of the multiplication protocol.
Random solved bits: SOLVED-BITS()
The protocol ([b]B , [b]p)← SOLVED-BITS() has no inputs. It outputs shares of
a uniformly random element b ∈ Fp and its bit decomposition (b0, . . . , bl−1).
The protocol RAN2() securely generates for i = 0, . . . , l − 1 a sharing [bi]p of a
uniformly random bit bi ∈ {0, 1} ⊆ Fp (Line 1). Then, [b]B is by construction the
bit-wise sharing of [b]p (Line 2) and b is uniformly random from
{
0, 1, . . . , 2l−1
}
.
So under the condition that the protocol does not abort (Line 5), b is uniformly
random from {0, 1, . . . , p− 1}.
The choice of the prime p is very important for this protocol. If b ≥ p, it
does not fulfill the output requirement, i.e., b ∈ Zp. The prime p has to be
chosen in such a way that the protocol only aborts with a small probability, i.e.,
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Protocol 14: ([b]B , [b]p)← SOLVED-BITS()
1 For i = 0, . . . , l − 1 in parallel: [bi]p ← RAN2().
2 [b]B = ([b0]p, . . . , [bl−1]p).
3 [c]p ← BIT-LT([b]B , p).
4 c← REVEAL([c]p).
5 If c = 0, then abort. Otherwise proceed as below.
6 [b]p ←
∑l−1
i=0 2
i[bi]p.
7 Output ([b]B , [b]p).
b ≥ p with a small probability. When the protocol does not abort, it leaks no
information except for Line 4: the protocol reveals that b < p . However, this is
not an “information” since b ∈ Zp. The total complexity is 21 rounds and 96l
invocations of the multiplication protocol.
Bitwise Less-Than: BIT-LT([a]B, [b]B)
The protocol ([c]p) ← BIT-LT([a]B , [b]B) computes a sharing of the bit (a
?
<
b) ∈ {0, 1}, where (a ?< b) = 1 iff a < b.
Protocol 15: ([c]p)← BIT-LT([a]B , [b]B)
1 For i = 0, . . . , l − 1 : [ei]p ← XOR([ai]p, [bi]p).
2 ([fl−1]p, . . . , [f0]p) = PRE∨([el−1]p, . . . , [e0]p).
3 [gl−1]p = [fl−1]p.
4 For i = 0, . . . , l − 2 : [gi]p ← [fi]p − [fi+1]p.
5 For i = 0, . . . , l − 1 : [hi]p ← MUL([gi]p, [bi]p).
6 [h]p ←
∑l−1
i=0[hi]p.
7 Output [h]p.
In Line 1, the protocol [ei]p ← XOR([ai]p, [bi]p) is computed in one round:
the local computation [d]p ← [ai]q − [bi]q is followed by the protocol [e]p ←
MULT([d]p, [d]p). In Line 2, the protocol ([fl−1]p, . . . , [f0]p) = PRE∨ ([el−1]p, . . . ,
[e0]p) computes the prefix-or ([fl−1]p, . . . , [f0]p), where fi = ∨l−1j=iej . Let assume
that a 6= b, and let i0 denote the largest index i, where ai 6= bi. Then a < b iff
bi0 = 1. Note that i0 is the largest i for which fi = 1, and thus gi = 1 iff i = i0.
Therefore, h = bi0 . In the special case a = b, clearly h = 0, as it should be.
The idea behind this protocol can easily be seen with the following example
where b > a:
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i l − 1 l − 2 . . . i0 + 1 i0 i0 − 1 . . . 2 1 0
a 0 1 . . . 1 0 0 . . . 1 0 0
b 0 1 . . . 1 1 1 . . . 1 1 0
e 0 0 . . . 0 1 1 . . . 0 1 0
f 0 0 . . . 0 1 1 . . . 1 1 1
g 0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
h 0 0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0 0 0
Here, hi0 = 1 because b > a. The protocol is private because only private
sub-protocols are called. The total complexity is 19 rounds and 22l invocations
of the multiplication protocol.
A.2 Inversion of a polynomially shared element
Inversion of a polynomially shared element: INV([a]qi ) [128]. Let Zq be the set
{x ∈ Z| − q/2 < x < q/2}.
Protocol 16: [x]qi ← INV([a]qi )
1 [r]qi ← JRP(Zq)
2 [y]qi ← MUL([r]qi , [a]qi )
3 y ← REVEAL[y]qi
4 If y = 0, then abort. Otherwise proceed as below.
5 [x]qi ← LOC-MUL(y−1, [r]qi )
Line 1 (joint random sharing over Zq): Player Pi holds a share of the random
value r. The goal of this protocol is to generate shares of a secret random
element from Zq. Each player chooses a random number rj ∈ Zq, shares it
according to Shamir scheme and sends the shares to the respective players.
Then each player adds up all the received shares rem q to obtain the share
of a random value. The protocol requires O(1) round and O(lk2 log2 k) bit
operations per player.
Line 2 (multiplication): Player Pi has a share [y]
q
i of the value y = r · a.
Line 3 : Player Pi reveals [y]
q
i without leaking any information about [a]
q
i since
[r]qi is his secret share of the random value r.
Line 5 : Player Pi gets his share [x]
q
i of x = a
−1 by computing [x]qi = y
−1 · [r]qi .
Actually, he performs the following computation: ([r]qi · a)−1[r]qi = a−1.
The round complexity is O(1). The protocol requires an expected number of
O(l2k + lk2 log2 k) bit operations per player.
Appendix B
Standard Definitions of
Game Theory
A game is an interaction between rational players who have objectives and
constraints. Each player has a set of possible actions. Each combination of these
individual actions has a collective consequence, which has an individual outcome
for each player. Each player has preferences on his outcome. The standard
definitions introduced in this appendix are taken from Osborne [129],[130].
In the “game of chicken” (Aumann, 1974), two players drive on a single lane
road in opposite directions. Both have two possible actions: either go on driving
(“dare”) or brake (“chicken out”). If both players go on driving, the collective
consequence will be a head-on crash. The outcome for each player will be
death, outcome for which he has his preferences. The collective consequence
and the individual outcomes have to be distinguished. For example, in an
asymmetrical game where one player drives a car and the other a truck, the
collective consequence will still be a head-on crash but the individual outcome
will be worse for the car driver.
Normal form game (Strategic game)
A k-player game Γ =
(
{Ai}ki=1 , {ui}ki=1
)
, presented in normal form, is deter-
mined by specifying, for each player Pi, a set of possible actions Ai and a utility
function ui : A1 × · · · × Ak 7→ R. Letting A def= A1 × · · · × Ak, we refer to a
tuple of actions a = (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A as an outcome. The utility function ui of
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party Pi expresses this player’s preferences over outcomes: Pi prefers outcome
a to outcome a′ iff ui(a) > ui(a′).
A two-player strategic game can be represented in matrix form. Suppose that
Alice and Bob take part to the “game of chicken”. They both have the following
(symmetric) preferences: the two drivers agree that the head-on crash is the
worst way out: (D,D) = (0, 0). The situation where they both give up and
both feel ashamed, ranks second: (C,C) = (4, 4). The best situation for Alice
is when Bob gives up and she does not and vice-versa for Bob: (D,C) = (5, 1)
and (C,D) = (1, 5). Table B.1 is the matrix form representation of this game.
Alice’s preferences are given in the first place (in black) while Bob’s preferences
are given in the second place (in grey). The best action for a party to play in
response to each action of the opponent is underlined.
Chicken out Dare
Chicken out (4 , 4) (1 , 5)
Dare (5 , 1) (0 , 0)
Table B.1: Matrix form representation of the game of chicken.
Nash equilibria
Let Γ =
(
{Ai}ki=1 , {ui}ki=1
)
be a game presented in normal form, and let
A = A1 × · · · × Ak. A tuple a = (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ A is a pure strategy Nash
equilibrium if for any i and any a′i ∈ Ai it holds that ui(a′i,a−i) ≤ ui(a), where
a−i
def
= (a1, . . . , ai−1, ai+1, . . . , ak).
In a normal form game it is easy to find pure strategy Nash equilibria (if they
exist). Every player identifies the best action(s) to play in response to each
action of the other player. For example, if Bob chickens out, the best action
for Alice is to dare (she has a payoff of 5 instead of 4 if she chickens out). If
Bob dares, the best response for Alice is to chicken out. Best responses are
underlined in Table B.1. A combination of best responses is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium.
The “game of chicken” has two pure strategy Nash equilibria: NE1=(C,D)
with payoffs (1,5) and NE2=(D,C) with payoffs (5,1).
Let Γ =
(
{Ai}ki=1 , {ui}ki=1
)
be as above, and let σi be a distribution over Ai.
Then σ = (σ1, . . . , σk) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if for any i and any
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distribution σ′i over Ai it holds that ui(σi,σ−i) ≤ ui(σ).
Assigning probabilities to tuples of actions corresponds to a widening of the set
of accessible payoffs (pure strategies are particular mixed strategies). There is
an additional mixed strategy equilibrium in the “game of chicken”: NE3=( 12 ·
D + 12 · C, 12 ·D + 12 · C) with payoffs ( 52 , 52 ).
Nash equilibrium is an interesting notion since Nash’s theorem states that
any strategic game, in which the strategies are finite, has at least one mixed
strategy equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, all players follow their strategy
independently of each other; however, it is often possible to reach higher expected
payoffs with correlated strategies. Achieving a correlated equilibrium requires
the presence of a mediator.
Correlated equilibria
Let Γ = ({Ai} , {ui}). Let ∆ (A) denote the set of probability distributions over
the finite set A. A distribution M ∈ ∆ (A) is a correlated equilibrium if for
any a = (a1, . . . , ak) in the support of M, any i, and any a′i ∈ Ai, it holds that
ui (a
′
i,a−i|ai) ≤ ui(a|ai). Note that ui (a′i,a−i|ai) denotes the expected utility
of Pi, given that he plays action a
′
i after having received recommendation ai
and all other parties play their recommended actions a−i.
Roughly speaking, in a correlated equilibrium no player has an incentive to de-
viate from his recommended strategy, i.e., from the mediator’s recommendation.
For the game of chicken, the best correlated equilibrium is CE1=(13 (C,D) +
1
3 (D,C) +
1
3 (C,C)) with payoffs (3
1
3 , 3
1
3 ) The payoffs of this correlated equi-
librium are higher than the payoffs of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, the payoffs are symmetric. The notion of symmetric strategy
profile seems in line with the notion of equitability. However, it is only an
“expected” equitability: if there is only one game (one-shot game), a player wins
5, 4 or 1. The result is “equitable” in only one situation, when the mediator
recommends (C,C)=(4,4).
Mediators can generally expand the set of equilibria in all directions, thus
they do not necessarily increase the parties’ payoffs. Mediators can also force
the parties into worse payoffs than in the unmediated game: CE2=( 13 (C,D) +
1
3 (D,C)+
1
3 (D,D)) with payoffs (2, 2) Implementing such a mediator is, however,
not really interesting.
Correlated equilibria always exist and form a convex set which necessarily
includes the convex hull of Nash equilibria. The highest payoffs achievable under
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the game theoretic settings correspond to correlated equilibria. Contrary to an
arbitrator, a mediator cannot force the players to follow his recommendation.
The mediator has to give his recommendation in such a way that no player has
an incentive to deviate from it. This restricts the set of payoffs achievable under
the game theoretic settings.
Feasible payoff profile
The set of feasible payoff profiles of a strategic game is the set of all weighted
averages of payoff profiles in the game.
In the game of chicken, an arbitrator would force both players to follow the
careful strategy: chickening out (C,C) with payoffs (4,4). The combination of
the careful strategies does not lead to an equilibrium. If Alice knows that Bob
will chicken out, she will dare. This payoff is not an equilibrium and is thus not
achievable under the game theoretic settings.
The notion of arbitrator does not fit to the game theoretic settings because it
does not take into account the rationality of the players. No player will follow
the recommendation of an arbitrator if it is not in his own interest. However,
this notion seems in line with the cryptographic honest-but-curious model. In
this model all players, even the corrupted ones, have to follow the protocol.
Set of expected payoffs in the game of chicken
All the payoffs inside the convex hull of the Nash equilibria correspond to
achievable payoffs of correlated equilibria. The set of correlated equilibria can
be larger than the convex hull of the Nash equilibria. This is the case for the
“game of chicken”.
The only two pure strategy Nash equilibria of the “game of chicken” are
NE1=(C,D) with payoffs (1,5) and NE2=(D,C) with payoffs (5,1). The game
has one more mixed strategy Nash equilibrium: NE3=(12 ·D+ 12 ·C, 12 ·D+ 12 ·C)
with payoffs ( 52 ,
5
2 ). The convex hull of the Nash equilibria is delimited by the
triangle NE1-NE2-NE3 in Figure B.1.
The payoffs inside the convex hull of Nash equilibria are always achievable by a
correlated equilibrium. However, in this game the set of correlated equilibria is
even larger than the convex hull of Nash equilibria. Two possible correlated
equilibria outside this convex hull are CE1=( 13 (C,D) +
1
3 (D,C) +
1
3 (C,C)) with
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Figure B.1: Equilibria of the “game of chicken”.
payoffs (3 13 , 3
1
3 ) and CE2=(
1
3 (C,D) +
1
3 (D,C) +
1
3 (D,D)) with payoffs (2, 2).
The set of correlated equilibria is delimited by the quadrilateral NE1-CE1-NE2-
CE2 while the set of feasible payoff profiles is represented by the dotted lines in
Figure B.1.
In term of achievable payoffs, the following inclusions hold for all games:
{pure strategies} ⊂ {mixed strategies} ⊂ {correlated strategies}.

Appendix C
Cake-Cutting in the
Game-Theoretic Setting
Appendix B showed how a mediator can improve the expected players’ payoffs
for a simple game. The cake-cutting is a more complex problem but the idea
remains the same: a mediator can potentially improve the players’ payoffs.
However, it is not so easy to switch from simple games to the cake-cutting
problem because players do not directly play a “cake-cutting game”, they follow
a procedure. This procedure, designed to produce a fair division, is the game.
Extensive form game
A game theoretic procedure proceeds by steps. The players do no longer
act simultaneously: in each step, a set of players execute some actions. “A
strategy for a player is now an adaptive sequence of moves consistent with the
procedure, which the participants choose sequentially when called upon by the
procedure” [87]. Such a situation is modelled by an extensive form game.
Extensive form games remove the assumption that players act simultaneously.
Playing the game defines a history of the actions taken by the players thus far,
and a player Pi’s strategy σi now specifies, for each step in which it is Pi’s turn
to move, a (randomized) function mapping possible histories to actions. Players’
utilities are now functions of terminal histories (i.e., histories that occur at the
end of the game), rather than functions of the strategy vector of the players [92].
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An example is given for the most simple cake-cutting procedure: “I cut, you
choose”.
“I cut, you choose” procedure
“I cut, you choose” is the easiest proportional procedure with two players. In
the procedures quoted from Brams and Taylor [87], all strategic aspects are in
parentheses and the arguments that the strategies perform are placed between
steps and labeled as “Aside”. Let Alice and Bob be the two players.
Step 1. Alice cuts a rectangular cake into two pieces (that she
considers to be the same size).
Step 2. Bob chooses a piece (that he considers to be at least tied
for largest).
Aside. Clearly, Alice’s strategy guarantees her a piece of size exactly
1/2 in her measure, while Bob’s strategy guarantees him a piece of
size at least 1/2 in his measure.
Suppose Alice and Bob want to divide a cake, half vanilla and half chocolate.
Alice likes chocolate as well as vanilla and, therefore, cuts the cake exactly
in the middle. The division gives two homogeneous parts: one of vanilla and
one of chocolate. Bob is only interested in vanilla and perceives chocolate as
insignificant. He thus chooses the vanilla part. According to his own subjective
valuation, he receives all the value of the cake while Alice only gets half of it
(in her own valuation). This allocation is not at all equitable: Bob values his
piece twice as much as Alice does.
This procedure can be modelled as an extensive form game but it cannot be
represented in a matrix form. Alice has an infinite set of possible actions: she
can cut the cake wherever she wants. It is a game with an infinity of subgames:
one for every possible cut. However, by restricting the set of possible actions, it
can be modelled in a matrix form.
Suppose that Alice only has two possible actions: making a conservative division
(division that is exactly 50-50 in her own estimation to garantee herself half of
the cake) or making an exploitative division (divison that is almost 50-50 in
Bob’s estimation). Thus, in a conservative division, Alice cuts the cake exactly
in the middle while in an exploitative division, she cuts the cake into a first
part with half the vanilla plus a small slice  of it and a second part with the
remaining vanilla plus the whole chocolate. To achieve an exploitative division,
Alice needs to know Bob’s preferences. Bob still has only two possible actions:
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taking the largest part or taking the smallest one. The idea of making an
exploitative or conservative division is taken from Brams and Taylor [82]. This
simplified game also illustrates the role of information and thus the importance
of secrecy.
“I cut, you choose” game in extensive form
Let us take as a working hypothesis that Alice and Bob have complete infor-
mation (it is common knowledge that Alice likes chocolate as well as vanilla
and that Bob is only interested in vanilla). This situation can be modelled as
an extensive game represented by the tree in Figure C.1. Let the small slice
be  = 1/100 of the cake. The payoffs correspond to the value that the players
give to the piece they have received.
( 5 0 , 1 0 0 )
( 5 0 , 0 )
( 7 4 , 5 2 )
( 2 6 , 4 8 )
A l i c e
C o n s e r v a t i v e
B o b
B o b
E x p l o i t a t i v e
L a r g e
p i e c e
L a r g e
p i e c e
S m a l l
p i e c e
S m a l l
p i e c e
Figure C.1: “I cut, you choose” game.
This game is alternatively represented in a matrix form (Table C.1). Contrary
to the normal form game, Bob has four different strategies. In an extensive
form game, Bob has to specify an action for all possible actions of Alice. For
example, Bob’s strategy LS means that he takes the largest piece if Alice is
conservative while he takes the smallest one if she is exploitative.
By modelling the game in this way, three pure strategy Nash equilibria can
be seen. The most interesting is (C,LS). This equilibrium shows that if Alice
114 Appendix C.
LL LS SL SS
C (50 , 100) (50 , 100) (50 , 0) (50 , 0)
E (74 , 52) (26 , 48) (74 , 52) (26 , 48)
Table C.1: Extensive form of “I cut, you choose”.
knows that Bob hates being exploited, - so much that he will in this case take
his revenge by choosing the “unrational” strategy, i.e., the smallest part -, she
will be conservative.
A mediator could improve the payoffs by advising, for example, the following
strategy: CE=( 13 (C,LS) +
2
3 (E,LL)) with almost symmetric expected payoffs
(66, 68). This is a correlated equilibrium: neither Alice, nor Bob has an incentive
to deviate from its recommended strategy.
Implementing such a mediator thanks to MPC is implementing a probabilistic
function. Such a mediator is useless to design an equitable one-shot procedure
because the payoffs of a correlated equilibrium are only symmetric expected
payoffs.
“I cut, you choose” game in normal form
Let us take as a working hypothesis that Alice has a complete information on
Bob’s preferences while Bob does not know Alice’s preferences. This situation
can be modelled as a normal form game (Table C.2. The game has a unique
equilibrium: (E,L)=(74,52).
L S
C (50 , 100) (50 , 0)
E (74 , 52) (26 , 48)
Table C.2: Normal form of “I cut, you choose”.
The “I cut, you choose” game illustrates the importance of secrecy. If Alice
knows Bob’s preferences and if Bob does not know hers, he will never receive
more than 52. Note that Bob cannot detect if he is exploited because he does
not know Alice’s preferences.
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